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CHAPTER ONE: A BACKGROUND
I. INTRODUCTION:
The birth of the modern state in the Muslim world was associated with a relatively new
phenomenon in the Islamic experience, which is the emergence of multiple contradicting
doctrines and ideologies for the Islamic state. In contrary to the case in other polities preceding
the modern state in the political history of Islam (i.e., empire state, sultanates, kingdoms, citystates, or the more primary forms as tribes), contemporary Sunni Muslims – and even Islamists –
do not agree upon one model or theory for the Islamic state. Despite the fact that all are claiming
Islamic reference, there are diverse theories, which include: the authoritarian traditional theory of
Wahhabism, the democratic theory claimed by Islamic democrats as Rashid al-Ghannoushi, the
theocratic democracy of Abu al-A„la al-Mawdudi, the idealistic theory of al-ḥākimiah (the
governance) of Sayyid Quṭb, and the semi-theocratic theory, the rule of religious scholars
„ulamā‟ , as in case of Afghani Taliban and Somali legal courts systems, which represent a Sunni
counterpart of the Shiite Velayat-e-Faqih theory1.
The emergence of the modern state carried many challenges to the traditional model of
the Islamic governance. The modern state is characterized by specific patterns of legitimacy,
constitutionality, citizenship, and sovereignty, which are different from those of the traditional
Islamic state. Therefore, many scholars point to inherent incompatibility between both states.
Bertrand Badie, for instance, states that the political modernity contradicts the cultural patterns
and the societal organizations of the Muslim World.2 In accordance to him, Heba Raouf argues

1

Abdelilah Belkeziz, The state in contemporary Islamic thought: a historical survey of the major
Muslim political thinkers of the modern era (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009).
2
Bertrand Badie (trans. by nakhlah friefer), al-dawlatan: al-dawlah wa al-mojtama„ fi al-gharb
wa fi dar al-islam (Beirut ; al-dār al-baiḍā‘: al-markaz al-ṯaqāphi al-‗arabi, 1996), 289.
1

that the modern state disintegrates and expropriates the Islamic notions of al-jamā„ah ―the
Group‖ and al-ummah, resulting in distortion and limitation of the Islamists‘ political
imagination about the modern Islamic governance.3
Recently, Wael Hallaq claims that the Islamic modern state is an ―Impossible State‖. He
argues that: ―The Islamic state, judged by any standard definition of what the modern state
represents, is both impossible and a contradiction in terms.‖4 He mentions many major
incompatibilities between both state models, including: positivist rational paradigm of the
modern state vs. the metaphysical normative paradigm of the Islamic state, the autonomous
sovereignty as one of the form-property in the modern state vs. the affirmation of the God
sovereignty in the Islamic state, and the centrality of the morality in the subject production in the
Islamic state vs. the technology of the subject production by the modern state, which aims at
creation of an efficient productive citizen.5
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, with the success of the Political Islam movements to
seize power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, the problematic of the Islamic state
was raised again and ignited serious conflict between Islamists and seculars. They combated
around many issues, as: the identity of the state, codification of the shari'ah, and the constitution,
what resulted in severe political polarization in the Arab Spring countries. Nevertheless, another
hidden conflict seems to begin simultaneously in the camp of the Islamists itself between the
Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood, the two major Sunni Islamic movements. The

3

Heba Raouf Ezzat ―naẓarāt fi al-khiāl al-syāsi lel-islāmyyin: eshkāliāt manhajiah wa syāsiah‖
in islāmyoun wa democratyoun: eshkāliāt benā‟ tayyār Islāmi democrāti, ed. Amr Shoubky
(Cairo: markaz al-drāsāt al-syāsiah wa al-estrātijiah, 2006), 44.
4
Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), ix – xiv.
5
Ibid., 5 – 12 & 155-160.
2

increasingly prominent role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring challenges Al Sa„ud‟s
position within the Sunni Islamic world.6

In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to

challenge the Saudi model of the Islamic governance and refutes the historical Saudi claim that
their ʿulamā‟-backed political system is the authentic Islamic model of governance. The political
gains of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates across the region were thought to reveal the
obsolescence of the Saudi Islamic state model.7
II. RESEARCH QUESTION, HYPOTHESIS AND OBJECTIVES:
The Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood movements are considered the major modern
Islamic movements in the Sunni Muslim World. Each of them calls for a different model of the
Islamic state. The Wahhabi ideology adopts a traditional state model,8 based on traditional
legitimacy, centralized hierarchical power, and patriarchal form of state-society relationship. In
contrast, The Muslim Brotherhood took a more adaptive approach, blending modern Western
political thought with the Islamic tradition.9 However, there are two main political trends within
the Muslim Brotherhood: a democratic one which could be traced in the writings of the founder
of the movement: Ḥassan Al-Bannā,10 and reaches its maturity by follower intellectuals as

6

Simon Mabon, ―Kingdom in Crisis? The Arab Spring and Instability in Saudi Arabia‖,
Contemporary Security Policy 33, 3 (2012): 548.
7
Stratfor Report, ―Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries.‖
http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/saudi-arabia-and-the-muslimbrotherhood-unexpected-adversaries/pdf (accessed 9-4-2014).
8
Simon Bromley, ―The States-system in the Middle East: Origins, Development, and Prospects‖
in A Companion to the History of the Middle East, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, 518
(Oxford: Blackwell Companions to World History, 2005).
9
Stratfor Report, ―Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries.‖
10
Tariq Ramadan, ―Democratic Turkey Is the Template for Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood‖, New
Perspectives Quarterly 28, 2 (2011): 42.
3

Rashid al-Ghannoushi, and an idealistic radical trend, exemplified in the concept of al-ḥākimiah
of Sayyid Quṭb.11
The ideological and political divide between the Saudi political system and the Muslim
Brotherhood is rooted in their histories. Despite their alliance and cooperation during 1950s and
1960s against their common enemy: the Nasserism, many evidences point to the negative stance
of the Saudi regime from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. At the beginning, the King „Abd al„Aziz Al Sa„ud, the founder of the Saudi state, refused to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to
establish a legal branch in the kingdom.12 Later on, the clash between the Saudi regime and alṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah (the Islamic Awakening) group, which represents a Brotherhood-like
version of Islamism, in the wake of the Gulf War in 1990s negatively affected the relationship
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi regime.13 Recently, the Saudi state declared the
Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group.14
Therefore, the research question is: what are the differences between the Islamic state
model in the Wahhabi ideology and the models adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood? And why
these differences are perceived by the Wahhabi regime as dangerous and perverted doctrines,
which should be banned and criminalized in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
My hypothesis is that the Muslim Brotherhood‘s theories of the Islamic state are in stark
contrast with the Wahhabi model, regarding: the constitutional order, the mode of legitimacy, the
11

Ana Belén Soage, ―Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?‖ The Muslim
World, 99 (2009): 294.
12
Stratfor Report, ―Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries.‖
13
Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 3.
14
BBC News: Middle East, 7 March 2014. “Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood
terrorist group'”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092 (accessed 12-4- 2014).
4

power structure and distribution, and the pattern of citizenship. Both Muslim Brotherhood
versions: the democratic and the radical, represent a direct threat on the authoritarian
conservative model of the Wahhabi ideology. Therefore, the fears of emergence of a new Sunni
Islamic state model that may de-legitimize the Saudi regime are responsible for this negative
Saudi stance from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.
The objectives of this study include:
a. Reviewing the political legitimacy theories and their different approaches in defining this
concept.
b. Defining the concept of the Islamic state and explaining how the emergence of the modern
state carried many challenges to the traditional model of the Islamic governance.
c. Discussing the emergence of the Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood movements,
highlighting the political and historical contexts, and the main religious scholars and
intellectuals affecting their political ideologies.
d. Comparing the Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood models of the Islamic state regarding:
the constitutional order, the mode of political legitimacy, power structure and distribution,
and the pattern of citizenship.
e. Exploring how the Saudi regime built its political legitimacy and the religious principles
upon which it relies.
f. Explaining how the Muslim Brotherhood political doctrines represent a threat to the religious
base of the traditional legitimacy of the Saudi regime, and how the spread of the former was
associated with legitimacy crises and political unrest in the Saudi Kingdom; the fact that
could account for the negative Saudi attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

5

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
Political legitimacy has been one of the key concepts in the political thought for
centuries. It could be traced in the works of Plato and Aristotle about the justice and the
classification of the governments. In the modern age, the philosophers of the social contract
contested the concept of divine legitimacy of the kings and called for a new rationale for political
legitimacy based on popular support. However, Max Weber‘s theory of political legitimacy,
formulated a century ago, is considered to be the seminal work in this field.15
a. Political legitimacy: a search for definition:
Political legitimacy is a common pivotal subject in different disciplines, such as:
sociology, politics, political anthropology, philosophy and law. The main problematic of this
concept is the justification of the right to rule and of political obedience.16 Max Weber defines
the legitimate authority as an authority which is obeyed ―because it is in some appreciable way
regarded by the [subordinate] actor as an obligatory or exemplary for him‖.17 Other definitions of
political legitimacy refer to the justified obligation as the main indicator of legitimacy. For
instance, A. J. Simmons‘ definition of the state legitimacy is ―the complex moral right it
possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects
comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce these duties.‖18 Jürgen Habermas also
states that: "Legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to be recognized" and according to

15

Mattei Dogan, ―Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories‖, International
Social Science Journal 196, 60 (2009): 195.
16
Jean-Marc Coicaud (trans. by David Ames Curtis), Legitimacy and politics: a contribution to
the study of political right and political responsibility (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
10.
17
Christopher Pierson, The modern state (London and New York: Roulledge, 2004), 17-18.
18
Mathew Coakley, ―On the value of political legitimacy‖, Politics Philosophy Economics 10, 4
(2010): 374.
6

Paul Lewis, "legitimacy may be defined as that political condition in which power holders are
able to justify their holding of power in terms other than those of the mere power holding.‖19
Nevertheless, many scholars point to additional aspects in the definition of political
legitimacy. Allen Buchanan argues that it is not enough to define legitimacy relying on the
notion of the right to be obeyed. The difference between the political power and the mere state
coercion is not only wielding power in a justified way, but also exercising power in a morally
justified way. Therefore, he states that: ―A wielder of political power (the supremacist making,
application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is legitimate (i.e., is morally justified in
wielding political power) if and only if it (1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most
basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power and (2) provides this protection
through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the most basic human rights‖20
Also Bruce Gilley, in his attempt to put an operational definition for political legitimacy,
states that the state is legitimate when it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and
exercising power. The notion ―rightfulness‖, according to him, includes three different aspects.
Firstly, the views of legality; that ―refers to the idea that the state has acquired and exercises
political power in a way that accords with citizen views about laws, rules and customs,‖
Secondly, the views of justification; that means the moral reasoning of legitimacy is in
conformity with shared principles and values. Thirdly, the acts of consent; that refers to positive

19

Nikos Kokosalakis, ―Legitimation Power and Religion in Modern Society‖, Sociological
Analysis 46, 4 (1985): 371.
20
Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 153-154.
7

actions that express citizens‘ recognition of the state‘s right to hold political authority and a
general acceptance to obey the decisions that result, as voting in election, tax payment,… etc. 21
b. Different approaches to the political legitimacy:
From the previous section, two approaches in defining political legitimacy could be
recognized: subjective and objective. From the subjectivists‘ standpoint, legitimacy is based on
conviction of the citizens – or most of them – that the authority to which they are subjected is
right and proper. On the other hand, the objectivists believe that legitimacy cannot rely only on
―mere floating conviction of the majority‖. Instead, it is based on socio-cultural base, manifested
in the compatibility of the government output and the society‘s value pattern. 22
According to J. G. Merquior, both subjectivists and objectivists belong to what he calls
―Belief theory of legitimacy‖, because both of them argue that political legitimacy is based on a
same logic; believing in the rulers‘ claims to power and the accordance of these claims with the
common value system in the society. He differentiates between this approach and the ―Power
theory of legitimacy‖, in which efficacy is a necessary condition of governance. Therefore, the
political power is considered legitimate when its holder can effectively call on other centers of
power for support. In this approach, the legitimacy is based on credibility not credence; it is de
facto not de jure issue. Yet, legitimacy based on mere power reserve, he adds, is scarcely
deserves its name.23

21

Bruce Gilley, ―The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries‖
European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006): 501-505.
22
J. G. Merquior, Rousseau and Weber: Two studies in the theory of legitimacy (London,
Boston, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 4.
23
Ibid, 6-8.
8

Chris Thornhill argues that political legitimacy question is usually examined from two
perspectives: political theory and sociology. According to political theory, legitimacy is a result
of rationalized procedures or norms, while, according to sociology, it is a result of an aggregate
of societally constituted attitude, shared practices and facts. According to the former approach,
the political system can be abstracted from its societal setting and its legitimacy can be externally
measured by normative postulates, while according to the latter, legitimacy cannot be assessed in
static, or externally theoretical norms; instead, it must be observed and described in a broad
societal context, as it comprises, not only norms, but also variable nexus of attitudes, practices
and functions.24
The major dilemma in the political legitimacy study is whether legitimacy is a matter of
norms and values or a matter of political reality. The realists affirm that meaning of politics
resides in power game itself; therefore, it is characterized by the autonomy of the rulers in
relation to morality. For them, politics is not defined by a finalism that would orient the decisions
and actions of the rulers; instead, it constitutes a framework within which individuals endeavor
to win out over the others. It could be reduced into confrontational relationships based on
competition between groups within a state or between states within the plane of foreign relations.
In such approach, politics has its own interests and terms of evaluation that are different from
morality, and hence, legitimacy has nothing to do with the justification of the right to rule or the
relationship between the ruler and the ruled, because this is alien to real political life. On the
other hand, Jean-Marc Coicaud believes that there cannot be sharp separation between both
aspects of legitimacy. He states that legitimacy as ―a right to govern is indissociable from a

24

Chris Thornhill, ―Political Legitimacy: A Theoretical Approach between Facts and Norms‖,
Constellations 18, 2 (2011), 135-136.
9

normative dimension‖. The practices of statesmen should be justified in correspondence to the
fundamental principles to which the members of the society adhere.25
To sum, the political legitimacy has diverse dimensions: belief and efficacy, subjective
and objective, normative and realistic, traditional and legalistic…etc. Consequently, it cannot be
defined or studied depending on one approach and neglecting the others. It should not be defined
using the normative references in terms of social values and convictions, overlooking the
efficacy of the rulers and the power relations in real politics. Also, it cannot be examined and
evaluated in terms of correspondence to moral parameters, disregarding how it is manifested in
social actions and behaviors.
c. Max Weber‘s theory of political legitimacy and its critics:
Max Weber is the best example of theorists who argue that political legitimacy is a matter of
belief. His theory of legitimacy is ruler-centered, based on different patterns of legitimacy claims
and subsequent motives for compliance. He defines the legitimate domination as voluntary
submission to power systems in whose validity the subject believes. 26
Weber differentiates between three terms: power, political power, and domination.
Power, according to him, means ―probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this
probability rests‖. As a specific form of power, political power is related to the ―striving to share
power or striving to influence power distribution either among states or among groups within the

25
26

Coicaud, Legitimacy and politics,77-79.
Merquior, Rousseau and Weber, 6&97.
10

state‖. Weber maintains that ―domination‖ is a special case of power.27 It indicates the
probability that a command within a given specific content will be obeyed by a group of persons.
The prestige of being considered binding is what he calls ―legitimacy‖.28
The Weber‘s legitimacy theory specifies three different forms of domination: (i) the
traditional domination by the patriarch or patrimonial prince, in which the authority rests with an
individual who has been chosen on traditional bases, (ii) the charismatic domination by warlord,
demagogue, or party leader, in which the authority rests on loyalty to exceptional heroism or the
exemplary character of an individual, and (iii) the legal domination by the bureaucrat or state
servants, in which the authority rests ―on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.‖ Weber prefers the legal form of
legitimacy, arguing that legal legitimacy implies harmony, efficiency, and order in the
bureaucratic organizations of the state.29
These different forms of legitimation, for Weber, represent three different stages of
political development: traditional form of authority, sanctioned usually by religious precepts,
dominates in early stages of a nation‘s development, the charismatic or populist leadership
dominates during the transitional phase, and the legal or bureaucratic authority is a feature of the
more developed states.30 He believes that process of formalization and rationalization is
inevitable transformation, wherein ethical references and considerations to sustentative justice

27

Murray Knuttila and Wendee Kubik, State theories: Classical, Global, and Feminist
Perspectives (London: ZED books, 2000), 50.
28
Pierson, The modern state, 17
29
Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of comparative politics: search for a paradigm (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 95 – 98.
30
H. J. Wiarda, Introduction to comparative politics: concepts and processes (California:
Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), 35.
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will be more and more eliminated.31 Moreover, Weber relates each form of legitimacy with
specific political culture. According to him, the dominated culture in the traditional authority is
submission to the religion or mysticism, the culture propagated by the charismatic authority is
that of the prophet leading a people to a new future, while the legal form of legitimacy is
associated with secularism and separation between religious and governmental practices.32 The
institutional features related to different types of legitimacy claim, according to Max Weber, are
summarized in the following table: 33
Institutional
variables

Types of legitimacy claim

Rulers

Traditional
Masters

Charismatic
Leaders

Legal
Functional superiors

Ruled

Subjects

Followers

Legal equals

Obedience

Personal

Personal

impersonal (to laws)

Rule- bound
(Traditions)
Retainers or
vassals
Traditionoriented

Non rule- bound

Rule- bound (Laws)

Disciples

Bureaucrats

Affectual

Rational-instrumental

Relationship
Staff
Predominant
social
action
orientation

Table (1): Institutional features of the different Weberian forms of domination
Mattei Dogan criticizes the Weberian theory of legitimacy and accuses it to be
anachronistic. Dogan‘s criticism is based on two arguments: first, if Weber‘s typology is applied
to the contemporary world, two of the three types of legitimacy can scarcely be found: traditional
and charismatic. ―Truly traditional legitimacy only survives in few countries such as Morocco,

31

Coicaud, Legitimacy and politics,19.
Chilcote, Theories of comparative politics, 101.
33
Merquior, Rousseau and Weber, 99,101.
32
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Jordan and Saudi Arabia‖. On the other side, there are no examples of charismatic legitimacy in
post-industrial societies, even if the charismatic phenomenon has resurfaced in some countries of
Africa and Asia.
Second, the legal form of legitimacy represents an amalgamation of many varieties. ―In
this amalgamation at least three kinds of rational legitimacy can be identified. The first is the
advanced pluralist democracies in which most of the citizens consider the regime to be
legitimate. The second variety represents what could be called authoritarian regimes, in which
civil rights are partially respected and which are governed by civilians. These regimes appear to
be legitimate only to part of the population….The third variety includes certain dictatorial,
tyrannical or totalitarian regimes that are rejected or passively tolerated by most of the
population, even if the people have no way of expressing their discontent.‖34
Another critique to the weber‘s theory of legitimacy is related to its emphasis on
association between secularization and the legal legitimacy in the modern state. Weber believes
that the formal legality is based on a rational law, which should not rest on values and should be
devoid of all sacredness of content.35 The Weberian theory overlooked the role of religion in
political legitimation in contemporary modern states. The claim of disconnection between
religion and power in modern society is misleading, because it supposes that power struggles and
power relations in these societies operate outside any religious and ethical context. Yet,
according to Clifford Geertz, power must always be legitimized within ―a symbolic cultural and
value laden frame of reference‖. He concludes that: ―Thrones may be out of fashion and
pageantry too, but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which it defines itself and

34
35

Dogan, ―Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories‖, 196-203.
Coicaud, Legitimacy and politics,20.
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advances its claims, and so does opposition to it. A world wholly demystified is a world wholly
dipoliticized‖ 36
Despite these criticisms, legitimacy theory of Max Weber is still of use in our research, as
its categorization of different forms of domination and the related patterns of political legitimacy,
political culture, and ruler-citizens relationship is an informative analytical tool in our cases. In
the light of Weberian typology of domination, Wahabbi and Muslim Brotherhood models of the
modern Islamic state will be examined, highlighting the main religious doctrines constituting the
traditional domination of the Saudi regime and the related political culture concerning the rulers,
the ruled, and the nature of relationship between them. On the other hand, the Muslim
Brotherhood doctrines about constitutional order, mode of legitimacy, power structure and
distribution, and pattern of citizenship will be discussed, explaining how these doctrines
represent a threat to the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, and how this could account for the
negative stance of the Saudi regime from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.
IV. METHODOLOGY:
In this research, the problematic of competing models of the modern Islamic state will be
addressed in the case of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood. The cases are chosen on occasion
of the current unexpected conflict between the both Islamist ideologies. Remarkably, the Saudi
state responded aggressively to the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake
of Arab Spring. Saudi regime, for instance, supported – financially and diplomatically – the
military coup against the Ikhwani president and the harsh crackdown of the movement in Egypt.
Later on, they declared Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group.

36
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As the studied topic in this thesis is the theoretical models of the modern Islamic state in
Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies; therefore, qualitative methods for data collection
will be applied. The main methodology will be the textual analysis of the main intellectuals‘
writings; such as: Rashid al-Ghannoushi, Sayyid Quṭb, ibn Taymiyyah and Mohammad ibn Abd
al-Wahhāb. The textual analysis means ―making an educated guess at some of the most likely
interpretations that might be made of that text.‖37 Although textual analysis as a methodology
was criticized because it is not a standardized procedure, it is an essential tool for discourse
analysis.38
The discourse analytical approach is an important methodology for studying different
ideologies. As the foundation of beliefs and attitudes, ideologies control the ‗biased‘ personal
mental models that underlie the production of their discourse.39 In this thesis, the discourse of the
founding ideologues and the main intellectuals of both Islamist movements will be analyzed,
exploring how ideological inclinations affect the reading and interpretation of the religious texts.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The main concept in this study is ―the modern Islamic state‖, which is a compound term
constituted of two elements: the Islamic state and the modern state. Therefore, before proceeding
in our study, it is necessary to discuss this complicated term, exploring: what is the meaning of
Islamic state, and what are the problematics associated with its definition? And then, light will be
shed on the concept of modern state and how modernity carried many challenges to the
traditional concept of the Islamic state.
I. The Islamic state: its rationale and definition:
Although there is no clear text in the Holy Qur‟an or in Sunnah ―the Prophet‘s traditions‖
that defines or even necessitates building a state, it has prevailed among Muslim scholars
―ʿulamā‖ that Islam does propose a political order, and it is both religion and state, and these two
aspects of Islam cannot be meaningfully separated from each other.40 The rationale of the Islamic
state is that Islamic teachings have many ordinances with social implications, which will be
unachievable or unbinding without worldly power applying and enforcing them. Such
coordinating and coercing agent that has the power of commanding right and prohibiting wrong
“al-„amr bil ma„ruf wa al-nahi „an al-monker” is the state.41
This rationale is explicitly elaborated in the following ibn Taymiyyah‟s words: human
beings cannot secure their interests unless they get together. On gathering, they become in dire
need to have a head. Allah Almighty obliges commanding right and prohibiting wrong, which
need power and authority. Also, other God‘s obligations as: jihad, justice, holding pilgrimage,
40
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Friday‘s praying, and religious festivals, defending the oppressed, and executing al-ḥudud
―corporal legal punishments‖, all of them need power and authority.42
The old Islamic scholars used to define the Islamic state, using the term ―dār al-Islām”,
as ―all the lands those fall in the Islamic domain, in which Islamic rulings are carried out and its
rituals are practiced, and therefore, Muslims have to defend it when it is attacked‖. 43 It is
obvious, from this definition, that it is not enough to define the Islamic state as the state that is
inhabited predominantly or even entirely by Muslims. It is needed also to be committed and to
apply the socio-political tenets of Islam or the Islamic shari„ah.44 Therefore, if the main elements
in the definition of any state are: the people, the territory, and the political power, the pillars of
the Islamic state are: al-ummah or the Muslim ‗people‘, al-shari„ah or the Islamic law, and alkhilāfah ―Caliphate‖ or the Islamic political system.
A. The Ummah:
Ummah is a compound term that has religious, political and cultural dimensions. It,
therefore, must be taken in its original Arabic form and cannot be translated easily to ―people‖ or
―nation‖.45 According to Emile Durkheim‘s definition, religion is ―a unified system of beliefs
and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and
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practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to
them‖.46 In Islam, such moral community is termed ―ummah‖.
However, it will be also a reductionism to confine the meaning of ummah to be a
religious community, because Islam is a political religion par excellence.47 After Hijrah and
emergence of the Islamic state in Madinah, ummah signified both religious and political unity
under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH, and after his demise, khilāfah became
the political vehicle of this unity.48
Yet, after death of the Prophet PBUH, two important developments occurred: the first
was the expansion of Islam to rule wide territories from Eastern Europe to South East Asia.
Secondly, various Islamic religious and political groups emerged as: Shiite and Khawarge. Both
factors resulted in splits of Muslim ummah into different sects and ethno-religious entities. Even
the caliphate state, which was the symbol of ummah unity, splitted, so that, many caliphs coexisted at the same time in different Islamic capitals as: Baghdad, Cordoba, Cairo, and Istanbul.
These complex religio-political changes that happened during the medieval age weakened the
collective identity of the ummah and gave it a general and minimal notion of the community of
believers. Hence, according to Peter Mandeville, the concept of ummah was declined till the
colonial era, in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which had witnessed the revival of ummah
sentiments in the face of the danger of colonialism.49
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As a sociological phenomenon, ummah can be viewed as a collective identity that is
grounded in the socialization process in Muslim societies. Individuals are socialized to identify
the values and purposes of their societies and internalize them. Moreover, rituals and ritualized
behaviors of the society further reinforce this identity and give the members a sense of similarity,
especially against the ‗Others‘ whose collective identities are different. 50 Consequently, the term
―ummah” represents a state of mind for Muslims, a form of social consciousness or an imagined
community, which united the faithful in order to lead a virtuous life according to the teachings of
Islam and to safeguard the boundaries of their land. It also represents a framework for
maintaining religious unity and accommodating the cultural diversities. A Muslim could go to
Morocco or Indonesia and would know how to behave, because the pattern of life would be the
same, all shaped according to the principles of Islam and general characteristics of ummah.51
To summarize the sociological function of the concept ummah, Van Nieuwenhuijze states
that this concept acts as both a symbol of cohesion and a cohesive force at the same time. At
first, it acts as an abstract entity symbolizing the cohesion of all Muslims as Muslims. Once it
had come into existence as an abstract entity, it, then, acts as a force maintaining and stimulating
this cohesion.52
Mohammad Asad defends the identity of ummah vis-à-vis the modern concept of
nationality stating that: ―Most people of our time have grown accustomed to accepting racial
affinities and historical traditions as the only legitimate premises of nationhood: whereas we
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Muslims, on the other hand, regard an ideological community – a community of people having a
definite outlook on life and definite scale of moral values in common – as the highest form of
nationhood to which man can aspire.‖53
B. The Islamic shari„ah:
Implementation of Islamic shari„ah is not only the main function or the most
characterizing feature of the Islamic state, rather, it is raison d'etre for it. Noah Feldman states
that the Islamic state is pre-eminently a shari„ah state, defined by its commitment to the legal
order imposed by it. He emphasized that ―the shari„ah is precisely what makes the state
Islamic‖.54
The word shari„ah means the Way of the God and the pathway of goodness, which aims
at both physical and spiritual welfare and well-being of people.55 It is the Devine law, which has
been provided in the ordinances of the Qur‟an and supplemented by the Prophet Muhammad in
the body of teachings described as his Sunnah.56 It is ―a set of principles on morality, dogma, as
well as practical legal rules, which are contained in the Qur‟an and the Sunnah‖.57 It represents a
moral law or a moral system, in which the law -in the modern sense- is a tool or a technique.58 It

53

Asad, The principles of the state and government in Islam,96.
Noah Feldman, The fall and rise of the Islamic state, (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton
University Press, 2008), 6,20.
55
Khaled Abou El Fadl, ―The Shari‗ah‖, in The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics, ed. by
John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 9 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press,
2013)
56
Asad, The principles of the state and government in Islam,3.
57
Kamali, ―Characteristics of the Islamic state‖, 23.
58
Hallaq, The Impossible State, 10.
54

20

is the classical or the traditional Islamic constitution – a constitution that, like the English
constitution, was unwritten and ever-evolving.59
From previous definitions, it is obvious that shari„ah is not a mere legal system in the
Islamic state; it represents ―a complex sets of social, economic, moral, and cultural relations that
permeated the epistemic structures of the social and political orders‖ in the Muslim communities.
It involved a theological substrate that directed much of the worldview of the populations, the
regulations of agricultural and mercantile economies that constituted the vehicle of material life,
political values and strategies that protect against any power abuse, a cultural rendering of law,
and judicial processes of writing, documenting, teaching, and studying. ―The shari„ah then was
not only a judicial system and a legal doctrine whose function was to regulate social relations
and resolve and mediate disputes, but also a discursive practice that structurally and organically
tied itself to the world around it in ways that were vertical and horizontal, structural and linear,
economic and social, moral and ethical, intellectual and spiritual, epistemic and cultural, and
textual and poetic, among much else‖.60
During the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH, identification of what is shari„ah
and how to apply its ordinances in different political and social situations was exclusively the
function of the prophet, guided by divine revelation. But after his death, revelation stopped and it
became mandatory for Muslims to do this task by themselves. During first few centuries, the
shari„ah academic and legal systems were established. Beside the Qur‟an, the main source of the
Divine revelation, Muslims depended on three other sources:
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a. Reference to actions and sayings of the Prophet, known collectively as his Sunnah, which
were captured by reporters and passed from one person to another.
b. In other situations, when Muslims were faced by new questions, which were not present
in the Prophet era, they used analogical reasoning or deduction by analogy “al-qiyās”.
c. Also, the communal or scholars‘ consensus “al-ijmā„” about how to do under particular
circumstances was another source of Islamic shari„ah.61
Interestingly, the foundation of the shari„ah academic and legal systems was not the work
of the Islamic ruler or the Islamic state. It was the Islamic community who produced its own
experts. The jurists and scholars emerged as civilian leaders who represent ―the heir of the
Prophet‖ and the guardians of Islam. They fulfilled many functions in the society, but the most
important ones were muftiship and judiciary functions.62
Mufti was a private legal expert who was responsible for issuing fatwa (Shar„i legal
answers) to different questions he was asked to address. Although his opinion ―fatwa” was not
binding, it was routinely used in courts to settle disputes. Furthermore, question-and-answer
activity was the first step in building the Islamic legal system. With time, fatwas were collected,
systematized and issued as ―law books‖.63
The judge ―al-qaḍi‖ was – like the Mufti – belonging to the guild of al-ʿulamā‟, and was
from the ordinary social ranks of the community. Yet, judges used to perform wider functions in
the Islamic state. Beside settlement of disputes, they were in charge to: (i) take care of orphans,
poor, and women who have no relatives to look after, (ii) supervise different transactions
between individuals as: sale, partnership contracts, and inheritance of deceased persons, (iii)
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inspect endowments, (iv) play the role of social mediators…etc. As both Muftis and judges were
well-trained on shari„ah law and at the same time involved in the everyday social activities in
their societies, they could develop the Islamic legal system, using ijtihād ―creative religious
reasoning‖ to face the new circumstances that were ever-evolving.64
Thanks to the flexibility of the religious texts and the diversity of the communities ruled
by Islam, multiple legal schools were founded with different methodologies of ijtihād, the fact
that accounts for the richness and adaptability of the Islamic shari„ah. By the end of tenth
century, no fewer than one hundred schools of fiqh had emerged, however; according to classical
legal reasoning, none of them could have an exclusive claim over the divine truth.65
Therefore, it is important to differentiate between jurisprudence ―Fiqh” and ―Shari„ah”.
There is only one Islamic shari„ah, which represents an abstract ideal, but there are a number of
competing schools of thought of fiqh, known as maḏāhib.66 Hence, shari„ah is far more concise
and very much smaller in volume than the legal structure evolved through the fiqh of various
schools of Islamic thought.67 It ―comprises those clear cut commands and prohibitions which are
contained in the Qur‟an and the Sunnah, and no more.‖68 While these deductions and
interpretations made by jurists “Fuqahā‟”, which are usually many in number, more
complicated, and contradict each other, are not sacred nor binding, despite the fact that they
acquired in the popular mind a sacrosanct validity and considered as an integral part of
shari„ah.69
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C. The Caliphate ―al-khilāfah‖:
The third pillar of the Islamic state definition is the Islamic political system, known as the
Caliphate ―al-khilāfah‖, although, it is argued by many authors that Islamic shari„ah does not
specify any form of government. It is argued that al-khilāfah or al-imāmah, which is generally
seen to manifest the Islamic perception of political organization, is mainly a result of the
interplay of juristic doctrine and historical precedent which do not constitute an obligation under
the shari„ah.70Mohammed Asad states that:
―Coming to the question of the concept of an Islamic State, one may safely say that there is not
merely one form of an Islamic State, but there are many; and it is for the Muslims of every
period to discover the form most suitable to their needs, on the condition, of course, that the form
and the institutions they choose are in full agreement with the explicit, unequivocal shari„ah
laws relating to communal life."71
The Caliphate was defined by old jurists as al-Māwerdi to be ―the succession of the
Prophet in guarding the religion and ruling the world affairs‖.72 al-Taftasāni also defined it as ―a
general leadership of both religious and worldly matters, as a succession to the Prophet
PBUH‖.73 Therefore, the caliphate is usually considered both a religious and a political post.
According to Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri, the Caliphate system, in order to be normative
―khilāfah ṣaḥiḥah”, must be characterized by three qualities and the defect in any of them
renders it deficient ―khilāfah nāqiṣah”. These qualities are:
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First: the Caliphate system should be built on a contractual base, i.e., the caliph should be chosen
by free bay„ah (pledge of allegiance), while using force and violence is completely illegal in a
true caliphate system.74
Second: the candidate who runs for the office of the caliphate should meet the eligibility
requirements to ensure the proper functioning of the government. These requirements include: to
be Muslim, adult, male, with intact mental and physical abilities, virtuous (committed to the
Islamic morals), expert in Islamic shari„ah, and characterized by Quraishi descent (the tribe of
the Prophet Muhammad PBUH).75
Third: Concerning the function of the Caliphate political system, it should have three criteria:
a. The caliph‘s government has both religious and political prerogatives. The religious
prerogatives include: defending Islamic creed, declaration of jihad (religious war), and
organizing some social rituals as alms “al-zakāt” and pilgrimage “al-Hajj”. Although the
political prerogatives of the caliph are flexible and changing according to political and
societal developments, they are usually categorized as executive prerogatives. They include
maintaining internal order and security, guarding borders, inspecting fiscal affairs, observing
and guiding his assistants as ministers, governors, and the like.76
b. In the exercise of all these prerogatives, the caliph should be committed to the Islamic
shari„ah.
c. The mandate of Caliphate state should include the whole Muslim lands “dār al-islām” to
ensure the unity of the Muslim world.77
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II. Problematics associated with the Islamic state definition:
The definition of the Islamic state is associated with many problematics, which could be
summarized in four items:
A. Applying western terminologies and concepts:
Mohammad Asad emphasizes that ―the ideology of Islam has a social orientation peculiar
to itself, different in many respects from that of the modern West, and can be successfully
interpreted only within its own context and in its own terminology‖.78 This problematic becomes
obvious on asking certain kinds of questions as: ―Is the Islamic state democratic?‖, or ―Is the
Islamic state a welfare state?‖, or ―should it be a federal state?‖…etc. According to Asad, using
concepts like democracy, welfare state, or federalism, which are originated and shaped in
different cultural context, and trying to apply it in the case of the Islamic state will be
inappropriate.
Even using the concept ―The State‖ to translate the Arabic term al-dawlah is argued to be
inappropriate too. The term ―state‖ in English has a static notion, while al-dawlah has an
opposite notion in Arabic. al-Dawlah means transformation from a state to another. Therefore,
Arabs used to differentiate between al-dawlah and al-mulk ―Dominion or Sovereignty‖. The
latter is a permanent authority, while al-dawlah points to one form of that authority: the dynastic
rule, and a prominent criterion of it: devolution of power.79 The idea of rotation and of
successive changes of dynasties is integral to the Arabic concept ―dawlah”.80 Even in the
Qur‟an, dawlah is used only in the sense of ―circulation‖, when it is stated that wealth should not
be circulated among the wealthy alone (59:9). All these meanings are clearly different from the
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concept of ―the state‖ or ―the nation state‖, the Western concept representing a European
phenomenon developed between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.81
B. The dilemma of the classical political Islamic thought:
Some authors differentiate between the Caliphate system under the rule of the
Righteously Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali), who rule during the years 1140 AH, and the Caliphate system that follows during the Umayyad, Abbasid, and the Ottoman
states. In the last few years of the era of the Righteously Guided Caliphs, the conflicts and
warfare between the Prophet‘s companions permanently affected the Islamic jurisprudence and
resulted in emergence of an adaptive political Islamic thought. Many deviations in the main
political Islamic values as the consultation ―al-shura”, the right to oppose and account the rulers,
and inviolability of the public treasury not only became de facto practices, but also were
religiously justified by many jurists and Islamic scholars.82
The best example of the deviation in the political Islamic thought as a result of the tough
experience the ummah passed by after the era of the Righteously Guided Caliphs is the deviation
in the concept of political legitimacy. After death of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH, Muslims
were divided regarding the way of his succession into two main groups: the first group, Shiites,
believes that al-imāmah is more serious to be left for the choice of the people without
designation from the Prophet. While the second larger group, known as ‟ahl al-sunnah, believes
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that succession of the Prophet should be decided by consultation ―al-shura‖ according to the will
of the people and their interests.83
In the Sunni tradition, as mentioned before, al-Sanhouri states that the normative
Caliphate system is built on a contractual base, and the only legitimate way to be a caliph is to
be chosen by free bay„ah (pledge of allegiance), while using force to hold that post is completely
refused.84 Asad also refers to the Qur‟anic verse ―O you faithful! Obey God and obey the
messenger and those in authority from among you‖ (4:59) to affirm that government in Islam
should be formed only on the basis of people‘s free choice. The expression ―from among you‖
refers to the community as a whole, not to specific class or family. Therefore, any assumption of
governmental power through non-elective means –for instance, on the basis of ―birthright‖ –
becomes illegal.85
In accordance to al-Sanhouri and Asad, Tawfiq al-Shāwi argues that al-shura ―the
consultation‖ is the pivotal constitutional principle in the Islamic state. He affirms that the
Islamic government is a shura government, which relies on a contractual base ―Contract of
Allegiance‖ or ―„aqd al-bay„ah‖. Being a contract, the bay„ah is only valid if it reflects the free
will of the people, without any coercion. Furthermore, it gives the ummah, the right not only to
choose the ruler, but also to account him and to impose any conditions and limitations on his
authority to guarantee the common good of the ummah, because any contract gives the
contractors the right to impose the conditions that guarantee their interests.86
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Hākim al-Muṭiri, however, mentions three deviated forms of political legitimacy, which
were justified by the Islamic jurists as de facto:
First: Driving political legitimacy from other sources than people consent, as arguing to be the
guardians of the murdered caliph‘s blood ―‟awliā‟ al-damm‖ as Umayyads did, or being the heirs
of the Prophet PBUH, as Abbasids did.
Second: Considering the designation of the Caliph to his successor a form of political legitimacy,
and claiming that the contract of Caliphate in this case is valid, even if the nominated successor
is a relative to the caliph (his father or his son), and regardless the people opinion, as alMāwardi states in his famous book al-aḥkām al-sultāniah ―the sultanic rulings‖. The importance
of this juristic opinion is that it religiously legitimates the hereditary succession and the dynastic
rule.
Third: Validating holding power using violence and coercion for fear of political chaos ―fitnah‖.
The famous Islamic jurist al-Nawawi states that: ―The third way –to hold the post of Caliphate –
is the coercion and takeover. Hence, if the imam died, and an omnipotent man seized power,
without designation or nomination from the previous imam and without people consent or
bay„ah (pledge of allegiance), and he was fulfilling the eligibility criteria for the Caliph post, he
then becomes a legitimate imam, to maintain order and stability. But if he does not fulfill these
eligibility criteria, such as being religiously ignorant or immoral, there are two opinions in this
case, and the correct one is validation of his ruling too, for the same reasons.‖ 87 This juristic
opinion follows what Merquior categorized as power approach of legitimacy, which depends
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only on efficiency of the ruler in calling upon resources and power centers in the state. However,
as he stated, legitimacy based on power reserve only is scarcely deserves its name.88
Eventually, Muslim jurists put minimal criteria for political legitimacy: as long as the
ruler could defend Muslim territories “dār al-Islām” and did not prevent his Muslim subjects
from practicing their religion, he is legitimate ruler, and rebellion against him is forbidden for
fear of disintegration of umma and spread of anarchy ―fitnah‖.89 Furthermore, the great political
efficacy of the defective Caliphate system and the glorious Islamic civilization flourished under
its rule masked the political deviations of the Caliphs and sultans, who seized power through
illegitimate ways other than shura and free bay„ah.90
The logic behind this adaptive attitude of the jurists was not only to please the rulers;
rather, in most of cases, it was an ijtihad to achieve as much public interests as they can.
Scholars seem to have no adequate power vis-à-vis the ambitious rulers, therefore, they adopted a
pragmatic strategy: to offer them a religious justification for their de facto power, in exchange
with implementation of shari„ah.91 They invented a new formula for political legitimacy, based
on the commitment to shari„ah and the ability to maintain order within the Muslim community
and to defend it.92 al- Māwardi is considered the best representative for this category of the
classical Islamic jurists. He was looking for a way to maintain the principle that the shari„ah is
binding on the rulers, who hold their posts depending only on their own power. However, as
Hamilton Gibb remarks, ―in his zeal to find some arguments by which at least the show of
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legality could be maintained, al-Māwardi did not realize that he had undermined the foundations
of the law‖.93
C. The underdevelopment of the political classical Islamic thought:
Under the pressure of adaptation, the political classical Islamic thought was deprived
from a healthy growth. In contrary to the other branches of the Islamic shari„ah, such as:
jurisprudence of rituals and personal status or theology, the political aspect was deficient. The
hegemony of the political over the religious and the predominance of the de facto logic in the
political arena did not encourage the Islamic jurists and thinkers to exert much effort in an
unfruitful field. Therefore, they did not provide suitable innovations or ijtihad for tools or
institutions to achieve the values and goals of the Islamic shari„ah as: consultation “al-Shura”,
accountability, and just management and distribution of public treasury.
This problematic will be tackled in the topic of ruler-citizens relationship. It is argued
that in Islam, the government is limited and the citizen‘s duty of allegiance is conditional.
According to al-Sanhouri, the government is limited by two main boundaries: it should not
transgress the ordinances of the Islamic shari„ah and it should exercise its power for the benefit
of the whole ummah.94 Asad expands the limitations of the government authorities further. For
him, the government necessitates their citizens‘ obedience only when: it is elected according to
the people‘s free will, it is adherent to the Islamic value of consultation, it is committed to the
Islamic shari„ah and does not give any order in contrary to its rulings, and finally its orders
should be physically and morally affordable. In return, the government, on fulfilling these
preconditions, has the right to call upon all the resources of its citizens. For instance, it has the
right to impose additional taxes and levies, rather than the alms “zakāt”, if it is necessary for the
93
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welfare of the community, it may impose a restriction on private ownership of certain kinds of
properties or natural resources for public utilities, and it may subject all physically able citizens
to compulsory military services.95 Moreover, Asad states that, in order to obtain the fullest
allegiance of its citizen, the government must assume active responsibility for their material
welfare and provide all economic facilities and social services necessary for maintenance of
human happiness and dignity.96
Unfortunately, although all these principles could be found in the classical workings of
the Islamic jurists, they did not elaborately discuss how to achieve them. Questions like: who
designates the Amir? how should the consultation “al-shura” and the accountability be
organized?, who are ‟ahl al-ḥal wa al-„aqd ―people of loosening and binding‖?, are they elected
or appointed by the Amir?, are their opinions obligatory or just an informal advice?, could they
cancel an order from the ruler or go to another institution for arbitration?, all these questions
have no clear answer in the classical Islamic thought.97
Moreover, the problem of the ill-developed political Islamic thought further aggravated
after the eighth Islamic ―Hijri” century. As one of the general symptoms of the Islamic
civilization retreat, ijtihad was stopped at the time when the Muslim ummah was exposed to
massive political, social and cultural changes. Hence, when the modern Muslim societies
emerged, the Islamic jurisprudence was not ready to cope with these unprecedented
developments.98

95

Asad, The principles of the state and government in Islam, 70-79.
Ibid., 87.
97
Roy, The failure of political Islam, 42-45.
al-Sanhouri, fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ „oṣbet al-‘umam, 198.
98
Sayyid Quṭb, naḥwa mojtama„ islāmi (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2013), 49.
96

32

D. The inevitable overlap between the sacred Divine shari„ah and the human thought:
The last problematic associated with the definition of the Islamic state is how to
differentiate between the sacred unchangeable part of the Islamic shari„ah and the human
context-related part, included in the jurisprudence "fiqh" and manifested in the Islamic historical
experience. As mentioned, Mohammad Asad states that the binding shari„ah is the clear cut
ordinances in the Qur‟an and Sunnah, while the deductions and interpretations made by the
jurists are neither sacred nor binding.99 However, the shari„ah consists only of broad principles
and doctrines100, which need interpretations and elaborations to be understood and implemented.
Therefore, the shari„ah is always presented to the Muslim community conflated with fiqh,101
making the human part (represented in the work of jurists) inseparable from the whole entity of
shari„ah.
The problem becomes more complicated, if we realize that these jurists‘ deductions and
interpretations are –to great extent– shaped by the social, political and historical contexts. How
the Prophet‘s great companions (as the four Righteously Guided Caliphs) or the classical Islamic
jurists understood the shari„ah rulings and implemented them is considered by many a binding
and complementary part of the shari„ah. No doubt that those great men were able to understand
and implement shari„ah more accurately, nevertheless, their implementation is suitable only for
their historical context, and it is the duty of each generation to invent their social systems,
without being obliged to follow the historical precedents.102
A clear example of how the historical precedents are sometimes transformed into an
integral part of the binding Islamic shari„ah is the power structure and distribution in the Islamic
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state as described by jurists. Unlike the modern state, traditional or pre-modern states were
characterized by centralized, undivided, personal-vested political power.103 This could be applied
to the case of the mediaeval Islamic state. Therefore, in the classical workings of the Islamic
jurists, authority is vested in the office of Imām, who is the supreme executive and administrative
ruler of the land and has a wide range of executive powers including an indefinite term of office,
unlimited power in fiscal matters and appointment of officials.104 The Islamic jurists did not
discuss the issue of Islamic state nor describe its structure and function as an institution; instead,
they listed meticulously the qualities – mostly subjective – of the main posts of the state as
caliphs or judges. The priority accorded to the personal qualities prevented development of any
thought regarding the subject of institutions. 105
Despite the emergence of modern states with institutionalized and divided political power
in Islamic countries, on reviewing the writings of modern Islamic theorists as Mohammad Asad
and Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri, both emphasize the central power of the head of the Islamic
state. al-Sanhouri argues that in normative caliphate system, the power should be centralized,
and the caliphs should have both religious and political prerogatives (executive and judiciary). 106
Asad also claims that many authentic traditions of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH support the
concentration of all executive powers in the hands of one person, whom he described as Amir or
Imām. Furthermore, he argues that there cannot be a radical separation of the legislative and the
executive branches of the government. He defended this integration through the instrumentality
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of the Imām by arguing that it overcomes duality of power which often places the executive and
the legislature in opposition to one another.107
In addition, the authoritarian tendency in the traditional Islamic thought is another
consequence of the conflict and the warfare between the Prophet‘s companions during the Great
Strife “al-fitnah al-kubra”, at the end of the era of Righteously Guided Caliphs. The fear of
political chaos and societal disintegration resulted in acceptance of the authoritarian domination
“al-Mulk al-„aḍuḍ” with Hobbesian qualities, because it seemed to be the only resort from this
chaos and the protector shield of religion.108
III. The modern state: its historical origin, evolution, and characteristics:
The second element of the main concept in this study is the ―Modern State‖; a concept
that refers to a socio-political construct began to emerge in Europe in the seventeenth century
according to the principles of the treaty of Westphalia, and spread to the whole world later.
Consequently, this concept is inextricably bound up with both European history and
philosophy.109
Historically, there were many diverse forms of traditional (pre-modern) states in
European experience: city-states, feudal systems, patrimonial empires, nomad or conquest
empires, and centralized bureaucratic empires.110 David Held categorizes five clusters of state
systems developed in Europe:
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1. Traditional tribute-taking empires;
2. Systems of divided authority, characterized by feudal relations, city-states and urban
alliances, with the Church (Papacy) playing a leading role;
3. The polity of estate, which emerged in the post-feudalism era, characterized by a power
dualism, i.e., power was split between rulers and estates, constituting bodies of various kinds
(local assemblies of aristocrats, cities, ecclesiastical bodies, corporate associations…);
4. Absolutist state, in which the absolutist monarch was at the apex of a new system of rule,
which was progressively centralized and anchored on a claim to supreme and indivisible
power;
5. The modern nation-states.
Emergence of the modern state in Europe was a product of many societal, economic, and
political changes, such as: demographic transformation, urbanization, industrialization, growing
social division of labour, commercialization and commodification, the rise of capitalism, the rise
of scientific modes of thought, transformation in the conceptions of rationality (including
secularization), and democratization.111
All these changes –collectively known as modernity– necessitate metamorphosis in the
political organization of the society. However, there was more than one pattern of conversion.
Some states arose through a gradual transformation of existing independent political units –
mostly medieval monarchies – as the case of Britain and France. Other states arose by the
unification of independent but dispersed political units. The major examples are Germany and
Italy. Finally, there were states that arose from the break-up of independent political units –
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mostly the empire states. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire
after the First World War are examples.112
The Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan describes four consecutive stages of the
modern states‘ evolution. Yet, he admits that only few European states went through these four
stages in a classical way and ―the history of each state is too complex and diverse to be covered
by a simple, uniform scheme‖. These stages are described as follow:
i. In the first stage, elites took the initiative for the unification of a given territory. The process of
territorial consolidation was achieved mainly by economic and military means, and many
institutions were built to perform essential functions of the state. These functions include: ―to
provide internal order and deal with disputes (police and courts), to provide external security
(armed forces and diplomatic services), to extract resources (taxes), and to improve
communications (roads and bridges)‖.
ii. The second phase, nation building, aims to create feelings of a common identity and a sense of
allegiance to the political system among the disparate populations of the new state. Many tools
were utilized to achieve this aim; standardized language was spread by compulsory education,
military conscription strengthened feelings of identity with the nation, and nation symbols –
such as a national hymn, national flag and national heroes – were emphasized.
iii. In the third phase, towards the end of the nineteenth century, democratic states were created.
The belief in the principle of electoral-based political legitimacy increased the political role of
masses, and hence, modern political parties were founded, the ideas of political opposition and
devolution of power were accepted and institutionalized, and the universal adult suffrage was
introduced.

112

Newton and van Deth, Foundations of comparative politics, 23.
37

iv. In the last phase, after the Second World War, the modern state reached its full maturity. The
democratic states, especially in the Western Europe, accepted the responsibility for the wellbeing of their citizens. Welfare states, committed to provide welfare services and equality of
opportunity, were created and wealth redistribution policies, as progressive taxation, were
adopted to strengthen economic solidarity between different parts of the population.113
This historical synthesis, according to Wael Hallaq, is one of the ―form-properties‖ of the
modern state. He emphasizes that modern state is a product of a cultural-specific location:
Europe. It is shaped by ―the terms of Enlightenment, the industrial and technological revolutions,
modern science, nationalism, capitalism, and the American-French constitutional tradition.‖114
Another essential feature of the modern state, mentioned by Gianfranco Poggi, is the
nationhood. Although, there is nothing intrinsically modern about existence of racial and
linguistic commonalities between people inhabiting the same territory, but in the modern states,
nationality encompasses more than these primitive bonds, such as: religious and cultural bonds,
historical experiences, and institutional legacies.115 Therefore, the modern state is commonly
termed a nation state, which is defined as ―a state based on the acceptance of a common culture,
a common history and a common fate, irrespective of whatever political, social and economic
differences may exist between the members of the nation-state.‖116
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Christopher Pierson specifies further seven characteristics of the modern state – mostly
derived from the writings of Max Weber – which distinguish it from other pre-modern or
traditional states:
1.Monopoly of the means of violence: according to Weber, the state is ―a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory‖.
2.Territoriality: the modern states became defined as geopolitical and geographical units,
occupying fixed and precisely defined territories; the feature did not exist in previous patterns
of states, such as empires.
3.Sovereignty: this means that the modern state represents the highest and final authority within
the territory governed by it, and it does not recognize any superior authority.
4.Constitutionality and rule of law: the modern state is characterized by presence of
constitutional principles and laws that regulate the process of governance, unlike the pattern of
―personal rule‖ that had prevailed in the traditional patterns of political societies.
5.Legitimacy: which means that, in normal circumstances, the state decisions and laws gain
public acceptance, based on legal legitimacy, in contrary to other forms of legitimacy,
mentioned by Max Weber, as the traditional or charismatic that prevailed in the pre-modern
patterns of the state.
6.Citizenship: although this concept is old, back to the Greek city-states, but it retreated in the
political communities that followed. With the French Revolution, it returned and acquired a
new meaning associated with the right to political participation, the equalities in rights and
duties, and the representation of sovereignty in the citizens rather than the king.
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7.A well-developed bureaucracy: despite the existence of administrative structures in the
traditional states, Weber remarked an evolution in the bureaucracy of the modern state. He
described many ideal attributes of it; such as: it has hierarchical structures, it is characterized
by specialization (i.e., each branch of which is committed to specific field of activity), it works
according to general regulations and policies dictated by the political authority, it implements
the rules impartially, and the recruitment and career advancements depend on technical
qualifications.117
Despite these detailed characterizing features, it is still hard to put a comprehensive
agreed-upon definition of the modern state. Roger Owen differentiates between two distinct
meanings of the concept of modern state: the state as a sovereign political entity (i.e., with its
own boundaries, its own flag, international recognition, and a seat in UN), and the state as ―a set
of institutions and practices, which combines administrative, judiciary, law-making, and coercive
power.‖ He states that the first is absolutely clear and easy to be used even in non-European
context, while the other is more problematic, because there is no consensus about it.118 Hallaq
points to different dimensions of the phenomenon of the modern state: ―the Weberian
bureaucratic, the Kelsenian legal, the Schmittian political, the Marxian economic, the Gramscian
hegemonic, and the Foucauldian cultural‖. Nevertheless, all of them are not necessarily accurate
or accepted.119
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IV. Emergence of the modern state in the Islamic experience:
Indeed, the date of modern states‘ emergence in the Islamic world could not be
determined precisely. It is an extended process, started in the era of Ottoman reforms, known as
―Tanẓimāt” between 1839 and 1867. These reforms were a result of a series of military defeats
that reflected a clear European superiority. They included military, financial, and administrative
radical changes. Most importantly, Tanẓimāt adopted legal and political innovations (drafting a
constitution, establishing a parliament, modernizing judiciary system… etc.); the developments
that probably put the foundation of the modern state.120
Nevertheless, some authors point to an earlier date for the foundation of the modern
states in the Islamic world; the date of the French campaign to Egypt and Syria, and the era of
Mohammad Ali, in the first half of the nineteenth century.121 Yet, definitely, the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, which had dominated most of the Islamic world for four centuries, in the wake
of the First World War and its replacement by European colonial powers was a true moment of
birth for the modern state systems in the Islamic experience.122
This unnatural birth of the modern states in the Islamic world negatively affected its
stability and efficiency. It was ―a brutal importation of European model into a segmented and
unstructured society‖.123 As the political modernity was an attempt to solve specific Western
problems (i.e., feudalism, the religious-political power struggle, disintegration of sectarian
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ties…etc.), when it was transplanted into other areas in the world, it subordinated them to its
logic, and its efficiency was linked to dealing with same problems with same priorities.124
Burhān Ghalioun elaborately states: the modern state has entered the Arabic political life
as a ripe fruit, unconnected to the long historical experience that produced it and deficient in the
values, thoughts and ethics that enable the society to correctly handle it. This explains why the
modern state became in Arabic experience a thought with fragile roots and pillars, and with
shallow impact on the individual and collective feelings and consciences. It became lacking
autonomous driving spirit and motivating goals, and incapable of achievement.125
Nevertheless, it seems that the Western claim of the necessity and effectiveness of the
modern state have gained acceptance in Muslim societies, even among the Islamists, who devote
their efforts to answer the question: how to Islamize the modern-state.126 Yet, on the other hand,
many scholars argued that the modern state has carried serious challenges to the traditional
concept of the Islamic state or Islamic governance. Hallaq discusses in his book ―The Impossible
State‖ many contradictions and tensions between both entities. He refused the Islamists‘
assumption that the modern state is a neutral tool that could be utilized to perform certain
functions according to the choices of its leaders and the views of their ideologies. Instead, he
believes that the modern state has its own values and metaphysics, which produce certain
political, economic, social, cultural and psychological effects.127
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The basic characterizing feature of the Islamic state, as mentioned before, is its
commitment to implementation of shari‟ah. The Islamic shari‟ah is described by Hallaq to be a
moral system aiming to establish an ideal life, and a central domain or paradigm, to which all
subsidiary social domains (politics, economy, education …etc.) are judged and controlled.128
Therefore, the Islamic state has a purely pedagogical role: to make man virtuous.129 Contrarily,
the moral imperative is relegated in the modern state to a secondary status, because it is shaped
by the Enlightenment paradigm - the paradigm that aims at economic and technical progress, and
emphasizes the rationality and scientific methodology. Therefore, if the Islamic state is guided
by moral transcendental paradigm, the modern state is guided by secular positivist paradigm, and
if the mission of the Islamic state is upbringing a moral Muslim subject, the mission of the
modern state is to produce a disciplined and productive national citizen.130
Another aspect of incompatibility between the modern state and the Islamic governance,
according to Hallaq, is their contradicting concept of sovereignty. The Islamic governance
cannot permit any sovereignty other than Allah, to His will it submits, and by His orders and
prohibitions it is bounded. In contrast, the modern state is a sovereign entity, not bounded by any
higher or transcendental sovereignty. Its sovereignty represents ―an inner dialectic of selfconstitution; i.e., sovereignty constitutes the state and is constituted by it‖.131
Sherman A. Jackson highlights another aspect of existential incompatibility between the
modern state and the Islamic governance: the legal system. One of the main characteristics of the
modern state is what Jackson calls ―legal centralism‖ or ―legal monism‖ that means that all laws
should be state-sponsored, uniform, equally applied to all citizens, and superior to all other
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reglementary regimes. Therefore, citizens of the modern state have to forfeit many aspects of
their valued regimes and commitments as an inevitable price of citizenship. The Islamic
governance, in stark contrast to this rigid monism, is characterized by legal pluralism, in which
shari‟ah rulings are applied variably on Muslims and non-Muslims in the same community. The
Muslim jurists did not only admit the right of non-Muslims to be committed to their religious
rulings, but also exempted them from many rulings of Islamic shari‟ah, as implementing some
corporal religious punishments “ḥudud” for some crimes as drinking wines or adultery. Some
exemptions, however, may be considered as discrimination in modern sense, as exemption of
non-Muslims from military service. This legal pluralism was not considered repugnant to neither
religious authority nor state sovereignty in the pre-modern Islamic state. The contradiction
between monistic legal system of the modern state and the pluralistic system of Islamic state is
the reason why codifying shari‟ah principles as positive laws is believed to be unachievable.132
The contradiction between the concepts of nationality –as a civic identity in the modern
state– and ummah – as a religio-political collective identity – is another important aspect of
incompatibility between the Islamic governance and the modern state. The European notion of
nationality is alien to Islam and is claimed to be repugnant to its universalism. Furthermore, the
nationalism is viewed by many of Islamists as pure jāhiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance).133 The
doctrinal and practical challenge of the modern state nationality to the concept of Islamic
governance could be summarized in two main points: first; in Islamic governance, according to
many jurists and scholars, the mandate of the Caliphate should include the whole dār al- Islām
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(Muslim lands)134, the condition that practically becomes infeasible in nation-state system of
governance. Secondly; there is incongruity between the rights of citizenship in the modern state
and the primacy of the rights of religious brotherhood within the ummah, as the modern state is
considered ―the exclusive repository of its citizens‘ allegiance‖.135
Globalization, as a vehicle for liberal democratic and capitalist ideology, further
complicates the project of Islamization of the modern state, according to Ismā„il al-Shatti. It
binds the nation states with certain economic, monetary, knowledge, communication, and
information systems, which remarkably limit the sovereignty of nation states, whatever the
ideology it adopts. Consequently, he wondered how any state could apply the Islamic economic
principles under the hegemony of the international economic institutions, or how it could
promote traditional Islamic values within societies that have undergone massive changes,
including: urbanization, individualism, predominance of Western education, consumerist
culture…etc.136
All aforementioned tensions and contradictions may explain why there are different and
contradicting versions of Islamic political ideologies and there is no one agreed-upon theory or
model for the modern Islamic state, and why all the modern models of the Islamic state are
always accused of being distorted in both theory and practice.

134

al-Sanhouri, fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ „oṣbet al-‘umam, 238.
Ayoob, The many faces of political Islam, 32.
136
al-Shatti, al-islāmyoun wa ḥokm al-dawlah al-ḥadiṯah , 61-96.
135

45

CHAPTER THREE: BIRTH OF ISLAMISM
In this chapter, modern Islamist ideologies (specifically, the Wahhabism and the Muslim
Brotherhood ideology) will be discussed, highlighting the historical and political contexts that
shaped these ideologies and resulted in their variations. However, it is important first to start
with the concept of Islamism itself: what does it mean?, what accounts for its emergence?, and
what are the different premises and factions that gather under its broad banner?
I. Islamism: what, why, and who?
Ideologization of religion is one of the prominent political phenomenon in the modern era
and one of the most puzzling and unexpected cultural phenomenon as well.137 As cultural
systems, religion and ideology show a great deal of conflation, because they share many features
and play similar social roles (e.g., legitimization, mobilization, and a guide for social action).
Furthermore, the conceptual conflation is increased due to mutual transformation between both
ideational systems, as in some cases religions have been turned into political ideologies, while in
others, ideologies was turned into pseudo-religions (especially, the totalitarian ideologies as:
Marxism and Fascism).138
Religion as political ideology is usually developed by coalitions of religiously based
political activists, who used religio-moral arguments to support their claims in politics and
applied their moralized premises about justice, opportunity, and equality to particular (and
usually contested) political and policy decisions.139 Hassan Rachik defined religious political

137

Manfred B. Steger, ―Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda‘s Islamist
Globalism‖, New Political Science 31, 4 (2009): 529.
138
Hassan Rachik, ―How religion turns into ideology‖, The Journal of North African Studies 14
(2009): 347–348.
139
Rhys H. Williams, ―Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?, Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 35, 4 (1996): 375-376.
46

ideology as ―a set of ideas that refer to religious tools and accompany political actions and
processes in a sustained and systematic way.‖ Therefore, religious ideology tends to deal less
with metaphysical and theological issues and focuses more on social and political topics.140
Accordingly, Islamism could be defined as ―Islam as a political ideology, rather than
religion or theology‖,141 or ―presenting Islam as the guiding principle, even the blueprint, of
government‖.142 It is ―the tendency to view Islam not merely as a religion in the narrow sense of
theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance
for political, economic, and social behavior.‖143
As a social movement, Islamism is defined also as Islamically-inspired political activism.
It is a ―political activity and popular mobilization in the name of Islam‖144, ―it is a modern
intellectual and political movement that seek to bring society and politics into agreement with
Islam‖,145 or according to the Turkish political scientist Mümtazer Türköne, ―it is an effort to
render Islam sovereign to all domains of life from faith and thought to politics, administration
and law, and the quest for arriving a solution to the problem of underdevelopment of the Muslim
countries against the West by establishing among Muslims unity and solidarity.‖146
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From the previous definitions, three main defining criteria for Islamism could be
observed: it is a modern phenomenon, it is an intellectual and political movement, and its main
premise is the belief in the comprehensive nature of Islam. According to many scholars, the
doctrine that Islam represents a total system is what leads vast majority of Islamists to call for
establishment of an Islamic state.147
Many cultural, political, and sociological hypotheses attempt to explain the rise of
Islamism phenomenon. Out of them, three main hypotheses will be discussed in this chapter: the
political nature of Islam, the reaction to colonialism, and the impact of modernity.
Concerning the first hypothesis, it refers to a cultural factor, that is, the political nature of
Islam. Islam is argued to be ―a political religion par excellence.‖148 It was born as a political and
religious community, a sect and society.149 The Prophet Muhammad PBUH and the succeeding
Righteously Guided Caliphs were the highest authority in both religious and political arenas.150
Moreover, the non-separation between religious, legal, and political spheres were supported by
the rulings of Islamic shari„ah.151 Therefore, Islamists built upon these historical and intellectual
facts in their endeavor to reunite the religious and political spheres in modern time,152
disregarding any societal and political changes happened from the era of the Prophet.
Nevertheless, many scholars refuse the historical claim of non-separation of religious and
political in Islam, as well as, the claim that the political nature of Islam is unique. Mohammed
Ayoob argues that the de facto separation of political from religious arena and subsequent
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supremacy of political started in the Islamic experience at the end of the Righteously Guided
Caliphate and continued throughout the three great Sunni dynasties: the Umayyad, the Abbasid,
and the Ottoman.153 According to Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, the separation
between religious and political or al-din and al-dawlah began later, after the emergence of local
or regional sultanates in Abbasid era from the tenth century onwards, despite the fact that their
separation was not complete, as the temporal rulers and religious scholars ―„ulamā‟‖ were in
mutually dependent relationship.154
On the other hand, the intermingling of religion and politics is not unique in case of
Islam. Manfred Brocker and Mirjam Kunkler have studied the phenomenon of the religious
parties that began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They define religious parties as the
parties that hold an ideology based on religion and mobilize support on the basis of the citizens‘
religious identity (using pre-existing religious institutions or networks). This political
phenomenon was associated with different religions; such as the Christian Democratic parties,
which emerged in continental Europe as the Church‘s reaction to the secularizing policies of the
nation-states. Later on, other religious parties emerged as Hindu-Nationalist parties in South
Asia, Jewish parties in Israel, and Islamic parties in the Muslim world.155
Consequently, Ayoob concludes that Islam is no more politicized than other religions.
The historical political role of papacy, religious roots of Zionism, the religious rhetoric of the
Hindu nationalist parties, and the role of Buddhist Sangha (the Buddhist community of monks)
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in defining national identity in Sri Lanka, all these manifestations disprove the myth of the
unique political nature of Islam.156
The second explanatory hypothesis assumes that Islamism was emerged as a reaction to
the colonialism. Bassam Tibi argues that modern Islam, as a political ideology, must be seen in
the colonial context. Islamism, despite its shrill accusations against European hegemony, is
unthinkable without European colonialism.157
Clifford Geertz thoroughly discusses the political and cultural context of the process of
ideologization of Islam. According to him, ―people who live in traditional societies are guided
both emotionally and intellectually in their judgments and activities by unexamined prejudices,
which do not leave them hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled and
unresolved‖. As a consequence of the military defeat and backwardness shock resulted by
colonialism, the traditional premises that had oriented Muslim peoples in the past lost their
usefulness, leaving them in a state of increasing doubt and loss of orientation. The lack of
adjustment between religious traditions and the new unfamiliar colonial context, the breakdown
of traditional consensus, and the fate of religious traditions were the predisposing factors that
lead to the ideologization of religion.158 In short, according to Karl Mannheim, The
ideologization of religion takes place within a context characterized by the rapid and profound
social and intellectual disintegration of stable traditional societies.159
Tibi, in accordance with Geertz and Mannheim, affirms that the colonial penetration,
which disrupted the social structures of Muslim societies, is responsible for spreading of political
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ideologies in these societies, including both Islamic and secular ones.160 Paul Salem further
explains Tibi‟s argument. He states that the colonial powers radically redefined the political
environment in terms of institutions and of political cultures and popular attitudes. As regard
secular ideologies, the colonial challenge ignited the emergence of some Western ideologies as:
national independence ideology and revolutionary populist ideology. On the other hand, the
social, political, economic and cultural transformations associated with colonialism created an
identity crisis for the individuals, due to ―lack of congruence between inherited orientations and
the realities of the contemporary environment.‖ Consequently, Islamic fundamentalism, as an
ideology, ―bestows a new identity upon a multitude of alienated individuals, who has lost their
socio-spiritual bearings.‖ In this regard, Salem quoted Geertz‘s words: ―ideology is a patterned
reaction to the patterned strains of a social role … It provides a ‗symbolic outlet‘ for emotional
disturbances generated by social disequilibrium‖ 161
The third hypothesis that attempts to explain the emergence of Islamism is contextually
related to the second, which is the impact of modernity. According to many historians, modernity
was brought about to the Muslim world as a result of colonialism, started with Napoleon's
expedition to Egypt in 1798.162 Nevertheless, the relationship between Islamism and modernity is
complicated. Islamism was argued to be a conservative reaction to and a rebellion against the
modernity. Although traditional Muslims accepted the material and technical aspect of
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modernity, they refused its way of thinking, as they believe that relativism of modernity
negatively affects the morality and the traditional values of Muslim communities.163
On the other hand, Islamism is argued to be a modern phenomenon too. Islamists are ―as
much products of modernity as they are reactions to it‖.164 Their dream of all-encompassing
religious government bespeaks a modern bias, as their imagined Islamic state takes the modern
model of the leviathan power, which pushes citizens toward the pure Islam.165
Islamists, while attempting to resist Western modernity and to build an authentic Islamic
theory for a new way of life, have borrowed many modern Western ideas. They not only
borrowed Western material technology, but also they borrowed many modern methods of
political and social organization as well as Western political ideas and symbols. 166
Furthermore, Islamism is not only a modern phenomenon, but also it could be considered
as a modernizing agent. It did not only get the benefit of the modern transformation of the
traditional Muslim societies, but it helped also in the entrenchment of such transformations. For
instance, Clifford Geertz points to the necessity of the spread of the politics in its modern sense
for the process of religion ideologization. Thanks to the emergence of the modern form of
political activism (the modern political organizations, the modern leaders and intellectuals, the
modern public space and the mass media), the ability to detach members of traditional societies
from their traditional ties and recruit them to adhere to a new system of ideas has significantly
increased, and hence, the religious ideologies were able to grow ever larger.167
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Another feature of modernity that had a great impact on the emergence of Islamism is the
print revolution and mass literacy, which rendered the fundamental Islamic texts available for
increasing masses in Muslim societies. In traditional Muslim societies, scholars ―„ulamā‟‖ were
the sole interpreter of Islam. Yet, after colonial domination, the traditional Islamic
establishments were accused by both seculars and Islamic revivalists to preach a ‗fossilized‘
form of Islam. Both factors (print revolution and mass literacy, and recession of the religious role
of traditional scholars) allowed religiously inclined individuals, usually educated in non-religious
institutions and engaged in secular professions, for practice their right to interpret the religious
scriptures in their own way. Those Islamic “thinkers” or “intellectuals” challenged the religious
authority of the traditional scholars, and succeeded to gain popularity for their Islamists‘
ideology.168
In sum, the Islamism benefited from modernization of the Muslim societies (emergence
of modern politics, increase literacy, modern education, individualism, recession of traditional
social forces…etc.) to overcome the religious hegemony of the traditional institutions, and to
spread its ideology and its own definition of religion through establishment of social movements
and political parties, and attracting members and supporters to these establishments.
Nevertheless, on doing so, Islamist movements helped to entrench the values of the modernity
and its mode of thinking, which they consider perverted and harmful to the morality of Muslim
communities.
However, it is important to observe that many of aforementioned dynamics and criteria
could not be generalized on the whole Islamist groups, as under the broad banner of ―Islamism‖,
diverse ideologies and movements are gathered. Despite similarities in their rhetoric and
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objectives, monolithic nature of Islamism, according to Mohammad Ayoob, is a myth. He argues
that the political, cultural, and socioeconomic manifestations of Islam - like the practice of Islam
itself -are to great extent- context specific and resulting from interpenetration of religious
precepts and local culture.169
Many classifications and categorizations are designed to differentiate between various
groups and ideologies constituting the Islamism phenomenon. The most common classification
of Islamist movements is the moderate – extremist ―or militant‖ subgrouping. This classification
is based on some vague criteria, for instance: the moderate Islamists accept to work within the
existing political systems, while the extremists do not recognize the legitimacy of these systems
and reject to work within these regimes. Also, the moderate group believes in gradual change
and adopts a peaceful strategy, through participation in formal political process to induce as
much political, economic, and social reforms as they can. Extremists, on contrary, seek to
overthrow the existing regimes and to induce immediate and radical changes in the society,
mostly by using violence.170
Another important categorization of Islamism is based on the historical evolution of this
phenomenon and the distinctive criteria of Islamist movements in different historical phases.
This typology, however, raises a problematic question: when did the phenomenon of Islamism
emerge?. The academic scholars gave three different answers to this question. According to
Geertz and Tibi, Salafism was the first modern Islamic ideology that presented an alternative to
the traditional visions of religion at the end of the 18th century.171 On the other hand, Mümtazer
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Türköne states that ―there seems to be a broad agreement that Jamāl al-Din al-Afghāni (1838 –
1897) was the founder of the Islamist ideology‖.172 Thirdly, according to Olivier Roy, the
Islamism phenomenon began more or less in 1940s. It could be traced in the society of Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, established in 1928, and the Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan, established in
1941.173
Bassam Tibi, according to this categorization, divided modern Islam ideology into two
types: the archaic variant, which calls for return to the authentic Islam of the Prophet PBUH, and
modernistic variant that calls for pan-Islamism and attempts to reactivate Islam as a mobilizing
ideology. For him, the Wahhabi movement belongs to the first category, while al-Afghāni
belongs to the second.174
Olivier Roy‘s categorization of Islamist movements is more or less based on the same
principle of traditional and modern subgroupings. The first category ―Fundamentalism‖ is the
oldest Islamic group that appeared as early as the eighteenth century and it includes further two
subgroups: traditionalists, constituted of clergies and „ulamā‟, who strictly follow the founding
religious texts, prefer the imitation ―taqlid‖, refuse the innovations and new ijtihad, and their
vision of shari„ah is essentially legalistic and casuistic. The second subgroup is the reformist
fundamentalists, who criticize the traditions and the popular religion (Maraboutism and
superstitions), and aim to return to the founding texts with their own ijtihad. Roy categorizes the
Wahhabi movement as well as al-Afghāni and his disciple Muhammad „Abduh (1849 – 1905) in
the latest subgroup.175
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The second Islamic revivalist group, according to Roy‘s classification, is the ―Islamism‖.
It has emerged in 1940s and manifested, as mentioned, by two large Islamic movements: Muslim
Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami, which were founded independently, yet, the overlapping
between their themes were striking and the intellectual contact between both groups were soon
established.176
The Islamists share some criteria with the reformist fundamentalists, such as: their call
for return to the pure Islam, implementation of shari„ah, and ijtihad, and their rejection of the
‗fossil‘ version of Islam preached by traditional scholars ―„ulamā‟”. On the other hand, Islamists
differ from the fundamentalists in their main principle: Islam is a global and synthesizing a
system of thought. Also, Islamists believe in necessity of ―Islamization‖ of society first – through
social and political activism – before implementation of shari„ah. Therefore, Roy argues that
Islamists insist less on prompt applying of shari„ah than fundamentalists.177
Nevertheless, William Shepard, in his typology, put Sayyid Quṭb and al-Mawdudi, who
belongs to Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami respectively, in the category of radical
Islamists rather than political Islamists. According to him, they share with Islamists their concept
of global Islam; however, they insist more on the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Islamic
ideology and refuse any form of apology or exchange between Islamic and Western ideologies.
They also emphasize the urgency of putting the shari„ah into practice and extending its scope to
include not only the political, but also other economic, social, and cultural fields.178
From all previous literatures, the historical evolution of the different variants of the
modern Islamic ideology or Islamism could be summarized in the following figure:
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Traditionalism

Salafi
Reformism

Modern
Reformism

Political
Islamism

Radical
Political
Islamism

Fig.1: Categorization of Islamism according to the historical evolution
With some generalization, the ideological differences between these variants of Islamism
are summarized in the following table:
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Their
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Table (2): Ideological differences between main versions of Islamism
II. Tale of two ideologies: Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood:
In contrary to the myth of monolithic Islamic ideology that is composed of eternal, purely
divine, and context-free doctrines, it was shown in the previous section of this chapter that there
are different ideologies within the Islamism trend. Each of these ideologies basically is a net
result of a reaction between three different elements: the sacred religious texts, the historical and
societal contexts, and the ideological inclination and the personal experiences of the founding
ideologues. Based on this argument, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies will be
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explored, as a necessary intro to study the Islamic state models they are adopting. This
ideological analysis entails comparing the contexts and the main challenges associated with the
foundation of these ideologies and the academic background and the ideological inclinations of
the founding ideologues. Then, in the light of these variables, the main religio-political doctrines
of these competing ideologies will be contrasted.
A. The historical and societal context:
Ideologies are not a closed system of ideas, which are static, abstracted and insulated from
the continually changing political and sociological environment. Nevertheless, the core doctrines
of each ideology are to great extent determined by the challenges that stimulated its foundation,
and the historical context in which it was born.
For Wahhabism, it was the eighteenth-century Najd the birth place which determined the
core doctrines of Wahhabi ideology. The province of Najd is a broad desert located in the central
Arabian Peninsula. It is often described as a desert wasteland; therefore, it was almost an isolated
region.179
Sociologically, Najd was divided between nomads and settled folk “ḥaḍar”, both were
organized in small-scale autonomous polities, as tribal groups or chieftaincies. The tribal groups
were linked by ties of kinship, and each tribe had its own leading clan, from which, a sheikh was
selected.180 However, Najd in the early decades of eighteenth century was in a Hobbesian state;
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the tribes were warring, feuding, and lacking any unifying ideological or national esprit de corps
or „aṣabiyya.181
Politically, Najd occupied a marginal position in the Muslim world. After the weakening
of the Abbasid caliphate in the tenth century, none of the great Muslim empires had ruled it,
because it lacked valuable economic resources, it posed no strategic threat, and its conquest
offered no prestige.182
As regard the scholastic tradition, Najd scholars „ulamā‟ were educated in the main
Islamic learning centers in Hijaz, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. They mostly belonged to the Hanbali
jurisprudence school and there were certain family lineages specialized in maintaining and
transmitting this scholastic tradition, among them Al Musharraf family, to which Mohammad ibn
Abd al-Wahhāb belongs.183 However, the Wahhabi historians drew a grim picture for the
religious circumstances in the 18th century Najd. Ḥussein ibn Ghannām, for instance, mentions in
his book Tārikh Najd ―History of Najd‖, which is considered one of the official historical books
of Wahhbi movement, that before ibn Abd al-Wahhāb‘s call, the majority of Muslims, especially
in the Arab peninsula, had returned back to polytheism ―al-shirk” and al-jāhiliyyah (pre-Islamic
ignorance). Due to the predominance of religious ignorance, moral disintegration, and Muslims‘
division into different sects, ibn Ghannām believes that Islam before Wahhabi call had become a
‗stranger‘ once again, as one of the Prophet‘s sayings mentioned.184
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It could be generally concluded that the Wahhabi ideology at its inception was shaped by
three main determinants: (i) the tribal milieu, in which pre-modern forms of political
organization predominated, (ii) the classical scholastic tradition, mainly the Hanbali one, and
(iii) the spread of perverted Islamic doctrines and practices, which represented the main
challenges to which the Wahhabi movement responded.
Consequently, the Wahhabism was a traditional reformist movement, founded by a
classical Hanbali scholar. It followed a traditional scholastic way of preaching and depended on
tribal alliances and conquests in its expansion. As the main challenges stimulated its foundation
was basically religious, the Wahhabi movement adopted a purely religious reform agenda.
In contrast to pre-modern Najd in early eighteenth century, Muslim Brotherhood was
established in the newly developed modern state in Egypt in the second quarter of the twentieth
century, exactly in 1928.185 Between 1922 and 1952, -the decades usually described as the liberal
era in the modern Egyptian history- Egypt was legally an independent state, with mixed
monarchical and democratic features. In 1923, the king issued a new constitution that allowed for
establishment of a parliamentary government, yet, the power was actually divided between three
competing parties: the colonial British power, the king, and the parliament, mostly dominated by
al-wafd party (the independence party).186
It was cancelling of the Islamic Caliphate, European colonialism, and collaboration of
Egyptian elites with their colonial masters what drove Ḥassan al-Bannā to establish the Muslim
Brotherhood.187 Khalil al-Anani states that the most significant impact on al-Bannā came when
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he moved to Cairo in 1923 to pursue his higher education. He stunned by the gap between the
life in his rural town and the new life in Cairo where he exposed to the cultural and political
ferment taking place in the wake of 1919 revolution.188
In his diaries, al-Bannā described the period he spent in Cairo after the World War I. In
this period, he wrote, the current of disintegration increased, affecting the souls, the views, and
the ideas in the name of ‗mental liberation‘ and affecting the behaviors, morals, and deeds in the
name of ‗individual liberation‘. He maintained that this wave of atheism and immorality was
very strong and devastating.189
al-Bannā accused the Kamali coup against the Islamic Caliphate and the Egyptian secular
elites of acting to weaken the religion and propagate the Western materialism. He bitterly noticed
that, at that time, the ‗camp‘ of immorality and disintegration was in case of strength and vitality,
while the ‗camp‘ of Islamic virtue was shrinking and declining. Then, he decided to act
positively: to push the Islamic leaders to work together seriously against this current of atheism
and immorality or he will take the initiative.190
During the second establishment of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s, after
the assassination of its founder, the Brotherhood‘s main ideologue in this period, Sayyid Quṭb,
was faced by another challenge: the military secular regimes of the post-independence Arab
states. The liberal era in modern Egyptian history came to an end by the military coup executed
by the Free Officer movement in 1952. The proclaimed ideology of the post-independence Egypt
was secular: socialism and pan-Arabism. The new rulers established a single-party regime with
188
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highly centralized political power and hugely enlarged state apparatus. The new regime was
controlling all societal activities (economy, education, media, religion…etc.) and was supported
by large brutal security devices. In its endeavor to submit the religious to the political, the
military regime in Nasserist Egypt crushed the Islamic movements, specifically the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood.191 It was that harsh crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood what encouraged
radicalization of its thoughts, as shown in the writings of Quṭb, which he wrote from his prison
cell.192
In short, the first determinant that accounts for the variation in religio-political doctrines
of the Wahhabism and the Brotherhood‘s ideologies is the historical context and the founding
challenges. According to Hassan Rachik, the first forms of ideological reformism (Salafism,
Wahhabism) faced pre-ideological systems, such as: popular religion, local traditions, scholarly
interpretations,…etc.193 Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, was faced by other threats:
colonialism,

Westernization,

modern

secular

ideologies

(nationalism,

pan-Arabism,

socialism),and authoritarian military regimes. These challenges were obviously modern and
political, therefore, Muslim Brotherhood formulated a more politicized and a more mature form
of Islamic ideology, so that, it is considered the true founder of Islamism.194
Also, the difference in contexts had its impact on the structure of both movements.
Wahhabism was a traditional pre-modern call, which depends on classical preaching, writing
epistles, educating pupils, tribal alliances, and conquests.195 On the other hand, Ḥassan al-Bannā
created a modern organization to enact his agenda. He endeavored to propagate his ideas through
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different tools: preaching in unusual sites as coffeehouses, issuing journals, and establishing
local social services (schools, charitable organization, clinics…etc.).196 As a result, ‗cells‘ were
created in universities, in factories, and in administrations197 and within twenty years the
organization‘s membership was estimated to be two million and the movement had established
approximately 2,000 branches across the country.198 Furthermore, as a founder of a social
movement, al-Bannā worked on identification of the movement‘s mission, objectives, means,
and system of values and norms. Then, he followed different socialization tools to align the
Brotherhood‘s members with the movement‘s aims and values, in order to ensure a welldisciplined and coherent organization.199
B. The founding ideologues:
The variable personal experiences and the diverse ideological inclinations of the founding
ideologues are the second determinant that shaped the two competing Islamic ideologies and
accounted for their differences.
Wahhabi movement was founded by a young Najdi scholar Mohammad ibn Abd alWahhāb (1115-1206/1703-92).200 Two key important aspects of his biography have to be
highlighted to recognize his ideological inclination: his educational background and his personal
trait. ibn Abd al-Wahhāb belonged to a prominent scholarly lineage named Al Musharraf, which
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provided religious leaders (teachers, judges…etc.) to several oasis settlements in Najd. His
father, Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Sulayman Al Musharraf (d. 1740), was the chief jurist in al„uyayna.201
In his childhood, Mohammad acquired the standard introduction to the usual range of
Islamic sciences.202 Later on, he started his itinerary to pursue learning, a common scholastic
tradition for the Muslim „ulamā‟. Wahhabi sources confine his travels to Arabian centers: alAḥsā‟, the Holy Cities (especially Medina), and the southern Iraqi city of Basra. Other sources
report that he visited other Islamic centers, such as: Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus and even some
Iranian cities.203 Thus, Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb was a traditional scholar, whose
educational experience was purely Islamic. Some of his contemporary Islamic scholars,
including his brother Sulayman, accused him of lack of sufficient academic preparation and this
is what led ibn Abd al-Wahhāb to break with the common Islamic thought in his days.204
Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb is said to have a radical and confrontational personality.
On return from his scholastic itinerary, he brought a collection of books with him and described
them as ―the weapons I have prepared for Majma„a (his hometown in Najd)‖.205 The established
image of ibn Abd al-Wahhāb in Western world and in many parts of Islamic world gave the
impression of a religious fanatic, who denounced the Islamic traditions, adopted a literalist
interpretation of religious texts, intolerant of those who differed from him, discriminatory in his
attitude towards women and religious minorities, and committed to use of violence in the
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spreading of his religious ideas.206 Many evidences supported this negative image portrayed for
him, such as: his opinion that the Ottoman Empire and Muslims living in his days are guilty of
Shirk ―polytheism‖ and apostasy, declaring jihad ―sacred war‖ against them,207 stoning of
women for adultery, and destruction of the tomb of one of the Prophet‘s companions in al„uyayna “Zayd ibn al-khattāb”.208
Natana J. Delong-Bas, on the other hand, took an opposite stance, stressing the flexibility
of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb. She suggested that ibn Abd al-Wahhāb‟s definition of jihad
is defensive and he did not call his non-Wahhabi contemporaries as infidels.209 The takfiri
ideology (excommunication) for which the Wahhabis become noted historically was not present
in the writings of the founder.210 He also, according to her, believed that education, not jihad, is
the main way to lead Muslims to correct understanding of Islam, and in the latter part of his life,
from 1773, he abounded the formal position of the imam of the Saudi emirate to devote himself
to religious education.211
In contrast to his well-known literalist attitude, Delong-Bas argues that ibn Abd alWahhāb believed in the importance of reinterpretation of scripture in one‘s own time and place,
rejecting the taqlid and the literal interpretations of scripture.212 His support for ijtihād is
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apparent in his citation of multiple legal schools of thought.213 Even in women issues, ibn Abd
al-Wahhāb had relatively more ‗progressive‘ stances than predominating views in his time, for
instance: insisting on women‘s consent before getting married, her right to control the dowry,
and her rights to divorce if subjected to physical maltreatment.214 ―Portrayal of Wahhabism as a
monolithic, retrograde, ultraconservative, and, ultimately, jihadist school of thought seeking to
eliminate any alternative religious thought or practice‖ is argued to be based on historical
developments that occurred after ibn Abd al-Wahhāb‟s death.215
The main ideologues of Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥassan al-Bannā and Sayyid Qutb,
represent another generation of the Islamic revivalists. Both were born in the early beginning of
twentieth century (1906), brought up in a small conservative rural area, had a secular education
and secular professions, lived in a large modern capital: Cairo, and practiced a modern form of
religious and political activism.
Ḥassan al-Bannā was born in a small town of Mahmudiyyah in the province of Buhayra,
ninety miles North West of Cairo. His father, Sheikh Ahmed Abd al-Rahmān al-Bannā, was an
Islamic scholar and the local imam (prayer leader) of the town mosque. al-Bannā was affected by
his father‘s traditional religious learning and piety, and he received his basic education and
religious knowledge from him. After graduation from dār al-Mua„lmin (Teacher Training
School) in Damanhour (the capital city of Buhayra), he moved to Cairo at the age of sixteen to
join dār al-„ulum (a modern institute for higher education). In 1927, he received his first teaching

213

Delong-Bas, ―Islam and power in Saudi Arabi‖, in The Oxford handbook of Islam and
Politics, 414.
214
Niblock, Saudi Arabia, 26.
215
Delong-Bas, ―Islam and power in Saudi Arabi‖, in The Oxford handbook of Islam and
Politics, 413.
67

position at a government primary school in Ismailiyya in the Suez Canal zone, where he
established Muslim Brotherhood organization in the following year.216
From the early years of his life, al-Bannā was involved in different religious and
political activities. When he was a boy, he became a member in a sufi group called alhaṣāfyyiah, and at the age of thirteen, he was appointed a secretary of another group affiliated to
al-haṣāfyyiah that aimed to preservation of Islamic morality.217 Moreover, when the 1919
revolution erupted, he joined the demonstrations against the British occupation, an incident that
fostered al-Bannā‟s nationalist sentiment against foreign powers.218
The biography of Sayyid Quṭb, the second Brotherhood ideologue especially in 1950s and
1960s, shows many similarities with that of al-Bannā. He was born in the same year, but in a
village of Musha in Asyut Province in Upper Egypt. He was the eldest child of a relatively wellknown family that had fallen on hard times. His father was a member of Mustafa Kamel‘s alHezb al-Watani (National Party), and the family home was a meeting place for the political elites
of the region.219 He received a secular education in the public schools, and when he was fifteen,
he was sent to Cairo to complete his higher education.220 In 1933, he was graduated from dār al-
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„ulum, the same collage from which al-Bannā was graduated earlier, to work in the Ministry of
Education as school teacher too.221
Nevertheless, in his youth, Quṭb, in contrast to al-Bannā, did not join any Islamic
organization nor involve in any Islamic activities. Instead, he was attracted to literature222, and
during 1920s, till 1940s he was known as a secular intellectual, who worked as a novelist, poet
and a modern literary critic.223 Moreover, during his studying years, his uncle introduced him to
al-wafd Party, and he became a member in it and a disciple of his prominent writer and
philosopher „Abbās al-‟Aqqād.224 Later on, in 1945, he abounded his membership in the party
and the whole party system due to what he saw an opportunistic behavior of its politician.225
The eventual conversion of Quṭb from secular modernism to Islamism started around
1947, when he wrote his first Islamic book ―Social Justice in Islam‖ ―al-„adālah al-ijtimā„iyah fi
al-Islām‖. His Islamic views radicalized as a result of his stay in the United States (1948 – 1951),
where he came in close contact with the Western modern culture. It seems that he saw only
materialism, vulgarity, and sexual licentiousness in this culture, notwithstanding its great
scientific and technological achievements. Only in 1953 (at the age of 47 years old and after four
years of al-Bannā‟s assassination), Sayyid Quṭb joined Muslim Brotherhood officially and
became its intellectual leader and the main ideologue.226
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By exploring the academic background and the life experiences of the three founding
ideologues (just before the start of their call), we can reach some conclusions. Firstly, while ibn
Abd al-Wahhāb received a traditional Islamic education in the common religious centers in the
Arab peninsula and considered a professional scholar, both Ḥassan al-Bannā and Sayyid Quṭb
were ―laypersons‖, who were trained on secular education. They were ―Islamic Intellectuals‖ not
professional Islamic „ulamā‟. Secondly, ibn Abd al-Wahhā, for his traditional academic
background and life experience, was preaching a simple theological version of Islamism. On the
other hand, al-Bannā and Quṭb, thanks to their modern education and their contact with Western
ideologies and culture, developed a more inclusive and more sophisticated version of Islamic
ideology. Thirdly, Both ibn Abd al-Wahhāb and Sayyid Quṭb were characterized by a radical
personal trait. This may be explained, in case of ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, by the tough nature and the
plain vulgar culture of the nomadic life, and in case of Quṭb, by his poetic romantic personality,
which was further radicalized by his brutal prison experience. On contrary, Ḥassan al-Bannā, as
a professional activist and gifted organizer, exhibited more flexible and pragmatic features.
C. The main religio-political doctrines:
As an expected consequence of different historical and societal contexts, different
challenges, and diverse life experiences and ideological inclination of the founding ideologues,
the main religio-political doctrines of both Wahhabism and Muslim brotherhood ideology vary
greatly.
Wahhabism, as founded by a traditional Islamic scholar in response to hegemony of what
he thought to be perverted Islamic creed ―„aqedah‖ and practices, had a purely religious reform
agenda. The main precepts of the Wahhabi call were: the ummah had returned to shirk
―polytheism‖ and jāhiliyyah ―pre-Islamic ignorance‖, the ummah need to return back to the true
70

tawhid (God oneness) and get rid of al-beda„ (religious innovations), and the principle of
Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong “al-‟amr bi-l-ma„ruf wa al-nahi „an al-monker” is
the way to fight al-shirk and al-beda„ and revive the true tawhid and sunnah.227
A Prophetic tradition states, ―Islam first appeared as a stranger and it will one day
return as a stranger again‖. By this tradition the Prophet PBUH meant that as the idea of
God oneness and that the people must devote all worship only to Him was utterly foreign to
the Arabs in seventh-century Mecca, it will return once again a strange idea. Mohammad ibn Abd
al-Wahhāb believed that he lived in such a time,228 because many of the widespread practices at
that time as veneration of Saint‘s tombs and reliance on them to intercede with God and the
special rites of Sufi orders are considered by him as polytheistic practices.229
Instead, ibn Abd al-Wahhāb adopted a special concept of al-tawhid, constituted of three
main sub-concepts: “tawhid al-rububyyah” that means the belief that God is one,“tawhid al‟uluhayyah” that means the belief that God should be the only object of worship, and “tawhid
al-‟asmā‟ wa al-ṣefāt” that means the belief that God is unique in his name and attributes.
Furthermore, he claimed that it is not enough to proclaim the oneness of God in words to be
Muslim; this proclamation should be expressed also in worship, which should be dedicated to
Allah alone without any intermediary.230
Concerning reviving al-sunnah and fighting al-beda„, ibn Abd al-Wahhāb‟s definition of
shari„ah and his stance from Islamic fiqh were not as clear as his opinions in creed. Despite his
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theoretical call for ijtihad, he continued to adhere to the Hanbali juridical doctrine, which had
prevailed in Najd before him, and he never expressed any unprecedented juridical opinion.231
Consequently, the political doctrines of ibn Abd al-Wahhāb were just repetition of the
traditional Hanbali political doctrines and those of ibn Taymiyya in particular. According to
Madawi al-Rasheed, ―ignoring Islamic political thought has been a feature of Wahhabiyya since
its inception‖. Some of Wahhabi historians state that Sheikh Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb did
not concern himself with writing treatises discussing the nature of the Islamic imāmah, because it
has already discussed in passing.232
The three main political precepts in ibn Taymiyya‟s political thought, which have a clear
impact on the Wahhabi political ideology, are:
First: Establishment of the religion and implementation of the shari„ah is the main function of
the Islamic state: ―The purpose of political authority is to subject the whole human life to God
and to make His word supreme‖.233 Therefore, according to him, the basic functions of the ruler
is to reform the creed, make the people stick to religious rituals as praying, alms, and pilgrimage,
prevent the transgressions against Allah and against his subjects, protect Muslims, and propagate
Islam.234
Second: ibn Taymiyya has a traditional authoritarian political view and he follows Hobbesian
logic in defending his view: ―Man is social by nature. When they join hands they secure what is
good for all and avoid what is evil for all. For the same purpose they submit together to an
231
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authority, without which they cannot live‖… ―To obey the authorities and to wish them well is a
duty incumbent upon all Muslims unless they are asked to do something sinful. They are not
allowed to rise up against them so long as they establish ṣalāḥ (Goodness) among them.‖235
Third: As ibn Taymiyya believed that the presence of the imam is mandatory for both the unity of
ummah and the establishment of al-shar„, he justified the kingship and other ‗deviant forms‘ of
political legitimacy as a matter of necessity. Consequently, he stated that the imam could be
appointed by agreement of the people of loosening and binding ―‟ahl al- ḥal wa al-„aqd‖, or by
the former imam ―succession‖, or by de facto force, and in all these cases, he must be obeyed
from his subjects, because the obedience of the imām – even if he was unjust or immoral – is a
religious obligation, unless he orders a sin.236
As regard Muslim Brotherhood, it could be argued that it includes multiple ideologies
rather than one. In contrast to the Wahhabism that remained mostly a local movement, Muslim
Brotherhood‘s spread in many countries with diverse contexts allowed for emergence of different
versions of Brotherhood political ideologies: the socialist version of Mustafa al-Seba„i, the first
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood‘s leader, the radical idealist version of Sayyid Quṭb, and, later on,
the liberal democratic version of the Tunisian ideologue, Rashid al-Ghannoushi. Yet, in this
chapter, two variants of Muslim Brotherhood ideology will be discussed: the original ideology of
its founder Ḥassan al-Bannā, and that of the second most influential intellectual in the Muslim
Brotherhood history: Sayyid Quṭb.237
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Ḥassan al-Bannā was neither a traditional „ālem ―religious scholar‖, like ibn Abd alWahhāb, nor a professional theoretician and political ideologue, as Sayyid Quṭb.

238

He was

mainly ―a charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer‖.239 However, his main contribution
in the modern political Islamic thought is his characteristic definition of Islam
comprehensiveness – The definition he elaborately described in Resālat al-ta„ālim ―epistle of
teachings‖, in one of his famous quotes:
―Islam is a comprehensive system, concerned with all aspects of life. It is country and homeland,
government and umma. It is ethics and power, mercy and justice. It is culture and law,
knowledge and judiciary. It is matter and wealth, gain and prosperity. It is jihad and da„wa (call
to Islam), militia and idea. It is true creed and correct worship, indistinctively.‖240
This idea of comprehensive Islam was the pivotal doctrine in al-Bannā‟s religio-political
ideology, so that, he shaped his organization based on it. In Resālat al-ikhwān al-muslimoun
taḥat rāiat al-qur‟ān ―Muslim Brotherhood under the banner of the Qur‘an‖, he wrote: ―We are
not a political party, although the politics on the foundation of Islam is in the heart of our
idea…We are not a welfare association, although the charitable work is one of the our greatest
purposes…We are not sport teams, although the physical and spiritual sports are an important
part in our means…We are not any of these organizations‖241 Instead, al-Bannā defined Muslim
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Brotherhood to be ―a Salafi call, a Sunnite order, a Sufi reality; a political institution, a sport
team, a cultural association, an economic company, and a social concept‖242
For this inclusive multifaceted organization, al-Bannā assigned specific goals:

- ―Building the Muslim individual...with a strong body, high manners, cultured thought, ability
to learn, strong faith, correct worship, conscious of time, of benefit to others, organized, and
self-struggling character;

- Building the Muslim family: choosing a good wife or husband, educating children Islamically;
- Building the Muslim society;
- Building the Khilafa (a form of union between all the Islamic states);
- Mastering the world with Islam.‖243
Obviously, al-Bannā‟s objective was to found an ―Islamic state‖; nevertheless, he
followed a gradual ―bottom-up‖ strategy, depending mainly on popular education and broadbased social programs.244 He states that: ―government is one of their (i.e. the Ikhwān‟s) means,
and they will strive to take it away from any government that does not comply with the
commands of God. Yet the Ikhwan are more wise and strict than to proceed to the task of
government while the souls of the nation are in the condition they are in. A period is required
wherein the principles of Ikhwan will spread and dominate‖.245 al-Bannā strategically prioritized
preaching to indoctrinate the masses with the Brotherhood‘s ideology,246 and to achieve this
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goal, he ―recruited members door-to-door and built a welfare society–cum–athletic league–cum–
anticolonial movement held together by meticulous organization and strict master–disciple
relations.‖247
On the other hand, some authors accused al-Bannā of having vague and contradicting
ideology and strategy. For instance, shortly after its foundation, Muslim Brotherhood exercised
two patterns of activities that aroused controversy: First, the Brotherhood involved in the
political activity as a party and named candidates to run in the general parliamentary elections in
1941 and 1945. Second, the Brotherhood formed an armed wing called the Secret Apparatus “aljehāz al-khāṣ” that practiced violence, not only against the colonial power and Zionists in
Palestine, but also against its Egyptian political rivals.248 Also, al-Bannā once ―warned that other
measures would be needed, ‗some soft, others hard,‘ because the Society (i.e., Muslim
Brotherhood) would have to confront the opposition and the hostility of those who did not
understand the truth of Islam‖.249
Other example of the ambivalence in al-Bannā‟s political ideology is his stance from the
parliamentary system and political parties. Although, he defended the principles of
constitutionality and parliamentary representation, he aggressively attacked the multiparty
political system.250 Also, despite his criticism of the Egyptian political system in his days due to
its corruption and elitism, he decided in 1941 that it is an appropriate time to participate in the
official political process and field candidates to the parliament.251
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The ambiguity of Ḥassan al-Bannā‟s ideology raises a debate about its relation to the
reformist tradition. Some authors argue that al-Bannā was a continuation of that tradition. It is
well-known that al-Bannā was influenced directly by the ideas of Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib and
Rashid Redā, the disciples of the prominent reformist figure Muhammad „Abduh.252 However,
other observers have indicated that al-Bannā and Quṭb had a more radical approach to reform
than al-Afghāni and ‗Abduh. They believed that the formers were fundamentalists rather than
modernists. Nazih Ayubi, for instance, states that: ―whereas the earlier Islamic reformers such as
al-Afghāni and „Abduh were striving to modernize Islam, the following generation of Islamists
such as al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers were striving to Islamize modernity‖.253 Mohammed
Ayoob adds that the influence of other sources than reformist tradition (for example, the Sufi
Brotherhoods and the modern totalitarian ideologies) could be observed also on both the
ideological and organizational framework espoused by al-Bannā.254
The same debate was raised about the relationship between al-Bannā‟s and Quṭb‟s
ideologies; whether it is continuity or rupture. Many Islamist authors, as Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi,
Ṭāriq Ramaḍān, and Farid Abd al-Khāliq, emphasize the discrepancies between their
ideologies.255 These discrepancies were described by Ṭāriq al-Bishri in eloquent phrases:
―The thought of Ḥassan al-Bannā is a thought which cultivates land, and spreads seeds, and
waters a tree that spreads with the sun and the wind. As for the thought of Sayyid Quṭb, it digs a
trench and builds a fortification of high fences and lofty towers, an impregnable fortress. The
difference between them is the difference between peace and war.‖256
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al-jāhiliyyah ―pre-Islamic ignorance‖ and al-hākemiyyah ―God‘s sovereignty‖ are the
main concepts in the Sayyid Quṭb‟s religio-political ideology.257 Quṭb, in his ideology, was
greatly influenced not only by the doctrine of comprehensive Islam adopted by al-Bannā, but
also by the Islamic thought of the founder and the leading ideologue of Jamaat-i Islami; Sayyid
Abu al-A„la al-Mawdudi, from whom Quṭb borrowed these concepts.258
As for the first concept; al-jāhiliyyah, it is conventionally translated as ―the Age of
Ignorance‖, and refers to the Arabian society prior to the Prophet Muhammad‟s mission.259
However, Quṭb gave this concept a new definition. For him: ―Jāhiliyya—as God describes it and
His Qur‟ān defines it—is the rule of humans by humans because it involves making some
humans servants of others, rebelling against service to God, rejecting God‘s divinity (‘uluhiyyah)
and, in view of this rejection, ascribing divinity to some humans and serving them apart from
God. Jāhiliyya— in the light of this text—is not a period of time but a condition, a condition
which existed yesterday, exists today, and will exist tomorrow.‖260
Consequently, Quṭb concluded that Muslims of his days returned back to the state of
Jāhiliyya. He boldly stated that ―The existence of the Islamic life and the Islamic ummah, and
even the existence of Islam itself stopped long ago – a fact that may induce shock, panic and
disappointment to many who still like to be Muslims”.261 This is because these communities,
which claim to be still Muslim, are included within the jāhili communities, as they gave the most
peculiar characteristic of the God‘s divinity ―‘uluhiyyah‖, which is al-hākemiyyah, to other than
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the God. Hence, they received from other than God their system, canons, values, parameters,
customs, traditions, and almost all aspects of their life.262
Against Jāhiliyya, and in stark contrast with it, there is the concept of al-hākemiyyah. The
Arabic term hākimiyyah is a verbal noun derived from the Arabic root “h.k.m”, which means,
according to the Arabic-English Dictionary, governorship; rule; command; dominion, and
authority. This indicates that the word hakim signifies the highest governmental and legal
authority.263 Three main features characterize Quṭb‟s definition of the concept of al-hākemiyyah:
First: al-hākemiyyah is a matter of faith and creed, rather than politics and government, 264 as to
admit that Allah is the only hakim or sovereign is one of the necessities of the confession of faith
―There is no god but Allah‖.265 According to Quṭb, ―Allah exercises al-hākimiyyah in the human
life on one hand by controlling human affairs by His will (mashi‟ah) and determination (qadar)
and on the other hand by organizing their life conditions, rights, duties, relationships and mutual
obligations by His shari„ah and His programme. And in Islamic system, no one takes share with
Allah either in His will and determination or His shari„ah and programme, otherwise it will be
infidelity and polytheism.266
Second, al-hākimiyyah is not related only to the legislation and legal provisions or even to the
foundations and principles of government, but it extends to everything that God has prescribed
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for the organization of human life. ―This means that all-human conduct; political, economic, art,
literature or other activities must fulfill the ordinances of the hākimiyyah as acts of worship.‖267
Third, Quṭb gave the concept of al-hākimiyyah an idealist connotation, as he linked it with a
higher and all-encompassing system of the universe. According to Quṭb, ―Every part is in
harmony with all parts, and everything is in an integrated unity. Every existing part has a reason
for being that is related to this complete and absolute harmony… The universe is regulated by
one single law that binds all its parts in a harmonious and orderly sequence. This systematic
arrangement is the creation of the will of the one hākimiyyah‖.268 Consequently, as Man is
obliged to live in the frame of this universe, he is not allowed to follow any different programme.
The harmony between the programme that guides the human life and that of the whole universe
is the only way that guarantees the cooperation between the man and the enormous cosmic
forces, rather than collision with them, because, if he clashes with them, he will be torn and
crushed. This is why humanity today suffers a life of misery, confusion and turmoil.269
This idealistic radical view is not only characterizing the religio-political doctrines of
Sayyid Quṭb, but also, his strategy of change. He believed that preaching is not enough alone,
―because the usurpers of God‘s divinity would not voluntarily give up their power‖. 270 Therefore,
he called for forming a vanguard ready to launch jihad against the modern jāhili system.271 In
contrast to al-Bannā, Quṭb saw jihad the main tool to eliminate obstacles in the way of the
establishment of the Islamic state and to free men from all authority except that of God.272
Quṭb‟s radical thoughts drove Ḥassan al-Houḍaibi, the second general guide of Muslim
267

Khatab, ―Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb‖, 151.
Ibid.,152.
269
Sayyid Quṭb, hāḏā al-din (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2001), 24-26.
270
Soage, ―Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?‖, 303.
271
Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement, 28.
272
Soage, ―Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb‖, 197.
268

80

Brotherhood, in 1969, to write a book titled du‟āh lā quḍāh ―Preachers, Not Judges‖ and to
circulate it among the Brothers in prison to refute these radical ideas.
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Furthermore, al-

Houḍaibi‟s successor, „Umar al-Telmesāni, wrote in 1980s that the ideas of Sayyid Quṭb
represented himself alone and not the Muslim Brotherhood.274
In conclusion, there are many similarities and differences between Wahhabism and
Muslim Brotherhood ideology (with its both versions). The major similarity between the
aforementioned ideologues is their belief that the Islam in their days was in a case of recession
and their contemporary Muslims need to return back to the pristine Islam. They also shared the
same negative stance from the traditional Islamic scholars, blaming them for their responsibility
of the crisis of Islam.275
On the other hand, Ḥassan al-Bannā had a different stance concerning the Muslim
societies. He did not embrace the concept of al-jāhiliah adopted by both Mohammad ibn Abd alWahhāb and Sayyid Quṭb.276 He believed that only ―the open proclamation of apostasy, denying
well-known beliefs and religious obligations and deliberately twisting the meaning of the Qur‟ān
rendered the believer an infidel.‖ Also, while he shared the same concept of purifying Islam and
fighting religious innovations with ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, he did not see many Sufi practices to be
innovations. ―More generally, Banna‘s keen desire for Muslim unity to ward off western
imperialism led him to espouse an inclusive definition of the community of believers.‖277
Politically, al-Bannā‟s concept of Islam as a total way of life and his support of
constitutional rule and parliamentary government are completely alien to ibn Abd al-Wahhāb,
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who lived in a tribal milieu, in pre-modern political communities. Nevertheless, both agreed
upon the idea of religious functions of the ruler and his responsibility to fight immoral and
religiously forbidden practices.278
Regarding Sayyid Quṭb, he clearly radicalized and further politicized many religiopolitical doctrines of Ḥassan al-Bannā.279 The latter‘s concept of total Islam was transformed,
thanks to Quṭb, into a totalitarian idealistic ideology. Also, the violent means of change as
revolution and jihad, which were mentioned by al-Bannā in indirect expressions and
accompanied by excuses, became the only valid strategy to establish the Islamic state in Quṭb‟s
political thought.
Interestingly, both Quṭb and ibn Abd al-Wahhāb declared that Muslim societies in their
days became jāhili societies; despite the fact that they lived in totally different historical
circumstances. Moreover, both gave different explanation and used different logic to support
their claims. For ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, the main cause was the perverted religious practices and
doctrines, which he saw repugnant to al-tawhid ―God oneness‖. Sayyid Quṭb, in the post-colonial
era, had another justification; the Muslim communities retained Western legal, cultural,
economic and political forms instead of restoring Islam. For him, the imperative of faith in God‘s
oneness is to establish a social and political order in conformity with God‘s will as expressed in
His shari„ah. Therefore, ironically, Quṭb saw Saudi Arabia one of the jahili countries because it
did not establish such pure Islamic order.280
In table (3), the main differences between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood ideology
are contrasted:
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Wahhabism
Historical
and Pre-modern tribal milieu
political contexts:

Sources:

Main concepts:

- Traditional Islamic
education
- Hanbali jurisprudence
(especially, of ibn
Tayymiah)
- al-Jāhiliyyah
- al-Tawhid
- Revival of Sunnah

Strategy of change: - Radical
- Top-down
- Forming a traditional
religious call
- Tribal alliances and
warfare (Jihad)

Muslim Brotherhood ideology
Ḥassan al-Bannā
Sayyid Quṭb
- Modern state
- Modern state
- Colonialism
- Post-independence
secular military
regimes
- Secular education
- Secular education
- Reformists‘ legacy
- al-Bannā‟s and al- Sufi Brotherhood
Mawdudi‟s traditions
- Western utopian
- Western utopian
political ideology
political ideology
- Comprehensiven
- al-Jāhiliyyah
Islam
- al-hākemiyyah
- Islam is din wa
dawlah
- Gradual reform
- Bottom-up
- Building a modern
social movement
- Violent means are
exceptional and
regretted.

- Radical
- Top-down
-Forming a
revolutionary
vanguard
- Jihad

Table (3): the main differences between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology
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CHAPTER FOUR: MAKING A MODERN STATE ISLAMIC
Since the fall of the last Islamic Caliphate ―the Ottoman Empire‖ in 1924 and the
emergence of the modern states in the Muslim World instead, restoring the Caliphate or
establishing an Islamic state has become one of the major themes of the modern Islamic
movements. However, while Islamists were preoccupied answering the question ―how‖, they did
not pay enough attention to the question ―Is it possible?‖.
As mentioned, Max Weber associates the legal form of legitimacy characterizing the
modern state to secularism and separation between religious and political practices. 281 Wael
Hallaq also asserts that modern state is the social construct of the secular positivist paradigm of
Enlightenment.282 Therefore, he refused the Islamists‘ assumption that the modern state could be
a neutral tool, utilized to Islamize the society.283 Establishing the Islamic state in a secular state
framework is a myth, distorting the political imagination of the modern Islamists, according to
Heba Raouf. Islamists subconsciously embrace the Western model of the secular state, then, they
attempt to Islamize its structures without questioning the possibility of establishing the Islamic
state ideal in a context and using a tool that is different – if not inimical to – the philosophy of
the Islamic sociology.284
On the other hand, the claim of the absolute secularization of the modern state was
criticized by many scholars. Nikos Kokosalakis, for instance, states that ―The almost universal
separation of church and state in western societies does not necessarily imply a corresponding
separation between religious, culture and politics.‖ He refuses the argument that, in modern
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societies, power relations and struggles operate outside any religious and ethical context.
Moreover, in the Third World - in the Islamic countries in particular - , whose social and political
institutions operate also in a modern social context, the connection of political power and
religion is more explicit. In Islam, according to him, the religious and political spheres are hardly
separable, despite of absence of institutionalized church in Islam.285
Concerning the problematic of making the modern state Islamic, Islamists propose many
theories, varied basically according to their answers on the question: who is entrusted and in
charge to define and implement Islamic Shari„ah: the ruler, the ummah, or the ‗ulamā‟?. While
the traditional answer refers to the Imām (the highest political and religious post in the Islamic
state), the Islamic democrats emphasize that it is the Muslim ummah and the Shiite Velayat-eFaqih theory states that it is the Islamic scholars ‗ulamā‟. The following figure (2) summarizes
the main theories of the modern Islamic state.
In this chapter, the Wahhabi model of modern Islamic state will be discussed in
comparison to two theories of the Muslim Brotherhood: the democratic theory claimed by
Islamic democrats as Rashid al-Ghannoushi, and the idealistic theory of al-ḥākimiah of Sayyid
Quṭb. The comparison will include the constitutional order, mode of legitimacy, power structure
and distribution, and pattern of citizenship.
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The Ummah

The Ruler

-------

The Ulama

(a) Authoritarian Theory

(b) Democratic Theory
'God'

The Ulama

The Ruler

The Ruler

The Ulama

The Ummah

The Ruler

(c) Semi-theocratic Theory

The Ummah

The Ulama

(d) al-ḥākimiah Theory

Fig.2: Different theories of the modern Islamic state
I. Foundation of the Saudi state:
It is well-known that the founding moment of the Saudi state was the pact that was made
by Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb and Mohammad ibn Sa„ud in 1744.286 In that year, ibn Abd
al-Wahhāb fled to al-Dir‟iyya, an oasis settlement that was under the rule of a clan known as Al
Muqrin, which will become later famous as Al Sa„ud.287 In the first meeting, ibn Abd al-Wahhāb
declared that the people of Najd were living in a state of jāhiliyyah and that he aimed to purge
the Najd tribes from the un-Islamic practices. Then, he asked ibn Sa„ud to give him an oath to
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declare jihad for this cause, and in return, he will be the imām of the Muslim community.288
Mohammad ibn Sa„ud accepted the mission on two conditions: first, that Sheikh ibn Abd alWahhāb continued to support him if their campaign triumphed. Second, that Sheikh Mohammad
approved his taxation on al-Dir‟iyya‟s harvests. ibn Abd al-Wahhāb agreed to the first, but as for
the second condition, he replied that God might compensate the amir with booty that will be
greater than those taxes.289
This pact is thought to determine the power relations in Saudi state till now. From that
moment, there were three Saudi states: the first state persisted from 1744 to 1818, when it was
crushed by Ottomans and Egyptians. The second state was from 1824 and 1891. This state came
to an end as it was beaten by Al Rashid, a family ruling a local tribe. After the fall of the second
state, Abd al-Raḥmān Al Sa„ud fled to Kuwait as a refugee.290 Abd al-Raḥmān‟s son Abd al-Aziz
started to establish the third state in 1902 using an Islamic extremists‘ army known as Ikhwān
―the Brethren‖, as well as, the military support from the Kuwaiti Amir. In the next thirty years,
Abd al-Aziz conquered village after village, succeeded in unifying tribes in Najd, Hijaz, Ha‟el
and „asir under his rule and finally declared the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. 291 Later, he
bequeathed power to his sons: Sa„ud (1953-1964), Faisal (1964-1975), Khaled (1975-1982),
Fahd (1982-2005), and Abdullah (2005 - till now).292
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The modern state has emerged in Saudi Arabia as early as it gained an international
recognition in 1932. Depending on British support, Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa„ud started to establish the
state apparatus. The British adventurer Harry St. John Philby played a key role in foundation of
Saudi bureaucracy and was responsible for negotiation with American and British oil companies
seeking to exploit Saudi oil.293 The second phase of modernization began in late 1950s and early
1960s (especially under the rule of King Faisal). Two main factors catalyzed the process of
modernization in this period: the oil revenues and the challenge of Nasserism. The result of this
process was bureaucratic expansion, adopting welfare programs, creation of modern army and
security apparatus, institutionalization of the religious and judiciary authorities, development of
the modern education system, foundation of chambers and tribunals of commerce, and
declaration of many regulations: as the labor code and civil servants code.294
The bureaucratic modernization, however, was not accompanied by political
modernization. The Saudi political institutions have stayed severely underdeveloped or even
completely absent.295 In 1990s and early millennium, increase domestic and international
pressures for reform, after the crises of Gulf War and Sep. 11, forced the Saudi regime to
modernize its political institutions. In 1992, King Fahd issued the Basic Law of Governance
which represents the first Saudi ‗constitution‘ and announced the setting up of the Consultative
Council,296 while the municipal councils were created in 2005.297
From this brief history of the Saudi state foundation, two remarks could be observed:
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i. The Saudi state ―owes its birth to an alliance between religion and politics‖.298 From 1744 pact,
Al Sa„ud monopolizes the political power, while the religious power is controlled by Al Sheikh
(the descendants of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb).299 A mutual dependence relationship has
been established between both parties; ―the ‗ulama helped to shape the type of the state which
emerged, and they in return were used by the King in the achievement of his political
objectives‖.300 The Wahhabi „ulamā‟ used to give religious legitimation to Saudi regime‘s
decisions and policies by issuing fatwas (religious edicts), especially in critical times or in
controversial issues, such as: the crush of Ikhwān ―the Brethren‖ revolt in 1927, stationing of
American troops during Gulf War, and participation in Israeli-Palestinian peace process.301 In
return, Saudi regime allows for the Wahhabi „ulamā‟ to control over the social arena through
controlling the formal religious institutions (such as: the Council of Senior Religious Scholars
“hay‟at kubār al-„ulamā‟” and the Organization of Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong
“hay‟at al-‟amr bi-l-ma„ruf wa al-nahi „an al-monker”), religious education, legal system, and
the Islamic affairs ministry.302
This division of labour between the Kings and the Wahhabi scholars represents,
according to Madawi al-Rasheed, a kind of secularism. Wahhabi scholars exclusively control
religious praxis and the social sphere to ensure compliance, while the Royal Family and
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technocrats with modern educations were in full control of politics, economy, foreign relations
and defense matters.303 Therefore, he concludes that:
―The relationship between religion and politics in Saudi Arabia clearly illustrates that the state is
not a ‗theocratic unitarian state‘, as described by an earlier generation of scholars and often
repeated in the Western media. The Saudi regime is a hybrid formation that subjects religion to
political will. It is neither fully secular nor religious. It is a pragmatic entity that has survived as a
result of the strength of the power of oil and mystification, both internal and external. It is best
described as a post-modern pastiche. The gap between the social sphere controlled by religious
scholars and the political sphere controlled by royalty is responsible for serious contradictions
experienced at the level of the individual and society.‖304
ii. ―The construction of the Saudi state was entirely guided from above‖.305 According to the
categorization of modern state foundation mentioned in Chapter Two, the Saudi state arose as a
result of unification of independent and dispersed political units. However, the unification of the
state was not a result of negotiations and agreements between different groups representing the
whole nation; instead, it followed the pattern of mediaeval conquests.
Larbi Sadiki argues that ―the Saudi state is superimposed on a stateless society‖. The Najdi tribes
were lacking any unifying ideological or national esprit de corps. There was no historical
tradition of the state in this region. Therefore, the Saudi state cannot be considered a continuation
of a previous state. It lacks institutional legacies and has no tradition of acting legally,
representing a nation, governance in the name of a public authority, or representing a general
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will. It is a clan state that resembles a private dynasty rather than a modern state and this
accounts for the patrimonial character of the Saudi state. 306
What Max Weber wrongly generalized in his analysis of the sociology of Islam could be applied
in the case of the Saudi state. Weber described Islam as a warrior religion, 307 in which the
warrior stratum was its social carrier. As a result, the Muslim homelands had been dominated for
centuries by a system of patrimonial bureaucracies as well as patrimonial political and economic
structures; the system which he termed the ―Sultanism‖.308 Al Sa„ud behaved as the warrior
stratum of the Wahhabi call. They treated other tribes as conquered lands; therefore, they
established a Sultanic state with a patrimonial regime, not a modern state with legal domination
and citizenship rights.
II. The Saudi state of exception:
As a result of the two aforementioned factors, the state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
represents a special case. If it is judged by the classical characterizing features of the modern
state, it will show many major exceptions. It is a hybrid polity mixing some criteria of the
modern state with others of the pre-modern dynastic state. Features like monopoly of the means
of violence, territoriality, and existence of a well-developed bureaucracy gave the Saudi state a
modern state appearance. On the other hand, the Saudi state retained many pre-modern
characteristics, especially: the constitutional order, the mode of legitimacy, the power structure
and distribution, and the pattern of citizenship.
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i. As for the constitutional order, Christopher Pierson states that constitutionality is an extremely
important component of the idea of the modern state. According to him, the constitutional
political order means the rule of law not the rule of men. Max Weber defines it as ―a consistent
system of abstract laws impartially administered by a rule-governed and non-partisan civil
service‖. Contrarily, in pre-modern states, patriarchal political, social, and economic powers
were largely undifferentiated and their activities are regulated explicitly in arbitrary, absolutist,
theocratic and dynastic ways.309
The Saudi state maintains the same classical Islamic constitutional order, in which
Islamic shari„ah, interpreted by Islamic scholars, was the unwritten constitution. This explains
why there was no constitution in Saudi state from its inception till 1992, when the Basic law of
Governance was issued. The Wahhabi scholars were who consistently opposed any written
constitution, because they believed it could reduce their importance.310
However, Andrew Hammond believes that the Basic Law of 1992 is not really a
constitution. Even it is named in Arabic al-niẓām al-‟asāsi lil-ḥokm not al-dustour (constitution),
because the latter is ―associated with the secular nation-state whose constitutions are regarded by
the ‗ulamā‟ as documents compromising the supremacy of the Qur‟an.‖311 Yet, the term
constitution is used in the first article of the Basic Law: ―The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a
sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, The
Holy Qur‟an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH).‖312
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According to Hammond, the Qur‟an and the Sunna in Saudi Arabia are interpreted
mainly through the Hanbali tradition. Hence, the Saudi constitution is embodied in a series of
Hanbali scholars‘ texts and opinions stretching over 1,100 years. Hammond specifies three main
works serving as the main references for the Saudi constitutional order: kitāb al-tawhid (The
Book on the God Oneness) and al-‟uṣul al-ṯalāṯah (The Three Principles) of Sheikh Mohammad
ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, and the collected fatwas of ibn Taimiyya (Fatawa Ibn Taimiyya), the key
scholarly reference for Wahhabism.313
In short, the Saudi state attempts to maintain the old formula of the constitutional Islamic
order, in which the shari„ah represents, as the English constitution, an unwritten and everevolving constitution314 or ―a judge-made legal system‖,315 the religious scholars, like what was
happening in the whole Islamic history, were exclusively responsible for defining and
interpreting it, and the rulers had the paramount responsibility to implement it. 316 But, in the
Saudi state, the scholar‘s capacity to guarantee the rule of law is much weaker than it was in the
classical Islamic history.317

Although, theoretically the shari„ah reigns supreme, the king has

the ability to control the scholars‘ caste fiscally and by giving him the prerogative to appoint
them in the main religious posts.318
ii. Secondly, concerning the mode of legitimacy, all states have to legitimize its system of
governance. According to Max Weber, this legitimation may depend on tradition, which means
to appeal to a ‗natural order‘ claiming to govern from immemorial time or to the God‘s Will.
313
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Also, it may be based on charismatic qualities of a leader, or sometimes on both: tradition and
charisma. Yet, the modern state is characterized by a specific form of domination; the legal
rational domination. This pattern, for Weber, is based on the belief in the legality of enacted
rules, whose actions are bounded by laws.319
Although Weber‘s typology of political legitimacy was argued to be anachronistic in the
contemporary world, because the traditional and charismatic modes of legitimacy are scarcely
found, the Saudi state represents a unique case, being one of the remaining states depending on a
pre-modern form of political legitimacy.320
In the Basic Law of Governance, in article 5, ―Monarchy is the system of rule in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder
King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. The most upright
among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and His Messenger's
Sunna‖321 In addition, article 7 states: ―Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its
authority from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate
sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the State.‖322
These two articles explicitly affirm the traditional nature of the political legitimacy in the
Saudi state. It is a dynastic monarchy that supports its claim for governance using a religious
frame. Furthermore, the Royal Family utilizes the historical role of the King Abdulaziz Al Sa„ud
in the foundation of the state to attain a sort of Weberian charismatic legitimacy. 323 The
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dominant official narrative in Saudi Arabia in the history books, the national museum, and in the
state-run media recounts ―the glorious history of the state formation under the wise leadership of
the King Abdulaziz Al Sa„ud”. He succeeded to unite diverse tribes and regions, and married into
all defeated tribes in order to instill a sense of nationhood, therefore, a ―city after city opened its
gates to his military forces‖.
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Accordingly, Gwenn Okruhilk concludes that Al Sa„ud bases

their claim to legitimacy on their alliance with the Wahhabi scholars and on their success in
conquest the state in 1920s and 1930s.325
Furthermore, Kjetil Selvik and Stig Stenslie mention four pillars for the Saudi state
legitimacy: the Al Sa„ud Family, the Wahhabi Islam, the Oil, and the international support.326
A. ―Saudi Arabia is often referred as a family business.‖ As mentioned, the king Abd al-Aziz Al
Sa„ud used to get married from all defeated tribes to consolidate his power. These wives gave
him thirty six sons in addition to twenty seven daughters. And today the Royal House of Al
Sa„ud has grown to be more than 4500 members.327 This huge membership enables the
Family to dominate all senior military and civil posts in the council of ministers,
governorates, defence and internal security apparatuses, and the foreign affairs institutions.328
On the other hand, to organize the Family‘s political participation and the throne succession,
many institutions were established; such as: a higher committee of senior princes (which was
established by King Faisal to advise him in major decisions),329 the Family Council (which
was an internal decision-making body, announced in 2000, and formed of eight senior
324
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princes), the Allegiance Commission (which was established in 2006 by King Abdullah to
lend a formal procedure to the selection of future kings and crown princes), and the
Transitional Ruling Council (which was established to govern in emergencies as health crises
and assassinations).330
B. The Wahhabi Islam is the second pillar of the Saudi state. It has served major functions in the
process of Saudi state foundation and legitimation. In his endeavour to build a nation state in
nationless societies, King Abd al-Aziz uses the Wahhabi Islam as ―an identity maker‖.331 In
atomized tribal milieu with absence of a minimal degree of nationhood sentiment, ―Islam in –
its Wahhabi brand – provided the only unifying force‖.332 Therefore, the Saudi state affirms
in its Basic Law of Governance its commitment to implement the Islamic shari„ah, protect
the Islamic creed, ―encourage good and discourage evil‖, undertake its duty regarding the
propagation of Islam (da„wa), and support the Islamic causes.333 It also asserts its religious
duty towards the Holy Places:
―Article 24:
The State shall develop and maintain the Two Holy Mosques. It shall provide care and
security to pilgrims to help them perform their Hajj and Umra and visit to the Prophet's
Mosque in ease and comfort.‖334
To highlight their religious legitimacy, kings of Saudi Arabia used to be called imām almuslimin ―the leader of Muslims‖ and in 1986, King Fahd took the title khadem al-ḥaramain
al-sharifain ―the custodian of the two holy sites‖. 335
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C. The revenue of oil provides the state another source of legitimacy. In 1938, an American oil
company discovered oil in Saudi Arabia and in 2004, it is estimated that Saudi Arabia is
controlling 13.1% of the world‘s production and 22.1% of the world‘s reserve of oil.336 The
oil revenues grew from $655 million in 1959 to $4.34 billion in 1973. Furthermore, due to oil
crisis in the next year, it grew to $22.5 billion and reached its peak in 1981 at $108 billion. 337
Therefore, while in the 1920s and 1930s, King Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa„ud used to distribute gifts
and subsidies to tribesmen and the Brethren ―al-Ikhwān” to support his legitimacy, the huge
oil revenues from 1960s enable the following kings to turn this selective patronage into a
general programme of social welfare. The state began to provide free medical and
educational services, guarantee positions in the government for university graduates,
subsidize basic commodities as food, electricity and fuel, pay housing allowances, financially
support individual businesses, and provide social security for the aged, the disabled, orphans
and women who have no means of support.338
Mamoun Fandy describes a set of four concentric circles to explain how the Royal Family in
Saudi state distributes patronage and welfare services to gain political loyalty. In the first
circle, there is Al Sa„ud themselves. The Royal princes are given a yearly stipend that
depends on the prince‘s position in the state and family hierarchy. The second circle includes
the aristocratic families, who are linked to the Royal Family by blood ties and marriage
relationships, such as: Al Sheikh and Al Sudayri. In the third circle, the Saudi trading and
entrepreneurial families (as the Juffali, Rajhi bin Mahfuz, and bin Ladin), who has limited
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tribal connections to Al Sa„ud, exist. The last wide circle includes all Saudi citizens, who
enjoy generous welfare services without paying taxes.339
D. The last source of the Saudi legitimacy, according to Selvik and Stenslie, is its alliance with
the world‘s superpowers. At first, Great Britain supported the foundation of the third Saudi
state and helped it to gain the international recognition. It also played an indirect role –
through British advisors – in the development of the modern Saudi state apparatus.340 After
the Second World War, a meeting between King Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa„ud and the American
president Franklin Roosevelt put the foundation of a special relationship between both
countries.341 In this mutually beneficial relationship, the Saudi regime guarantees the oil
supply for the United State, and in return, the United State provides the regime with
American arms and supports it against any regional threat. Thanks to this partnership, the
Saudi state succeeded to overcome the threat of military coups in 1960s, the threat of Islamic
Republic of Iran in 1980s, and the threat of Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq in 1990s. On their side, in
addition to securing oil supply, Americans gained Saudi support for their foreign policies in
the region. They, for instance, supported United States‘ struggle against communism and war
on terrorism.342
In conclusion, on contrary to Weberian claim, the legal legitimacy based on
constitutionality is totally absent in the case of the modern Saudi state. Instead, Al Sa„ud ―has
perpetuated their rule through a skillful combination of distribution, penetration, and coercion,
with a legitimating dose of ideology‖.343 They depend on pre-modern forms of legitimacy:
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traditional (dynastic and religious) and charismatic. Furthermore, they attempt to substitute the
legal political legitimacy by ―performance legitimacy‖344 through patronage and rentierism, and
to support their rule through the international alliances.
iii. Regarding the power structure and distribution, it is argued that in the modern states, the
political power is institutionalized, divided (multi-centric), and impersonal, so that, the political
apparatuses are distinct from both the rulers and the ruled.345 According to David Held, the
modern state ―has to be understood as a set of organizations and collectivities concerned with the
institutionalization of political power.‖346 Consequently, for Max Weber, the administration of
modern states would be bureaucratic, because it is ―the most rational known means of exercising
authority over human beings.‖347 Weberian bureaucracy is governed by fixed rules, run by
professional civil servants and managed by functional superiors with rational-instrumental
attitude.348
On contrary, the pre-modern state is like a pyramid of top-down authority, consists of a
hierarchical unified system with a single center of power. Furthermore, it has a simpler and a
more static structure, whose rate of growth and increased complexity are much slower than the
modern state.349 According to Weber, in the traditional domination, the administration staffs are
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mainly vassals, who are bounded by personal obedience to the ruler and dictates of the
tradition.350
The criteria of power structure and distribution as well as the bureaucratic apparatus
clearly reflect the hybrid nature of the Saudi state. The power is highly centralized, and largely
vested in the person of the king. Although the Basic Law states that the authority of the state is
divided into three branches: the judicial, the executive, and the organizational, it renders the king
the final arbiter in all these authorities:351
―Article 44:
The Authorities of the State consist of:
- The Judicial Authority
- The Executive Authority
- The Regulatory Authority
These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this Law
or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.‖352
The powers given to the Saudi king are too extensive353, including the following
prerogatives:
-

To ―supervise the implementation of the Sharia, the general policy of the State, and the
defense and protection of the country.‖

-

To dissolve and reconstitute the Council of Ministers and to appoint and relieve deputies of
the Prime Minister and member minister of the Council by Royal Decree (as the king himself
is the Prime Minister too).354
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-

To choose and relieve the heir by a Royal Decree.

-

To appoint and relieve the judges,355 and act as the highest court of appeal in the country.356

-

To appoint and dismiss military officers from service (as he is the Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces)

-

To announce state of emergency or general mobilization and to declare war.

-

To approve and amend laws, international agreements, treaties and concessions.

-

To appoint members of the Shura Council, and to dissolve and reconstitute it.357

-

To appoint governors and members of the municipal councils in each provinces (from 2005,
50% of municipal councils‘ seats become filled by election). 358
Therefore, the Saudi political system is very centralized and authoritarian with poorly

developed political institutions. It is neither representative nor accountable. It represents
―unusual form of palace politics, characterized by a great concentration of highly personalized
power‖.359 The basic political rights (establishing political parties, joining political organizations,
public criticism, organizing strikes and protests…etc.) are absent.360 According to Stephane
Lacroix, the political field is built entirely around Al Sa„ud as the exclusive repository of political
competence. Moreover, as pre-modern states, the power field in the Saudi state appears as a
pyramid that is divided into parallel sectors. ―In this configuration, only the Royal Family, set
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above the entire system, maintains vertical relations with all sectors making up the field of
power‖.361
As regard the bureaucratic apparatus in the Saudi state, although it is well-organized,
occupied by professional civil servants, and ruled by fixed regulations, the important posts in the
administration apparatuses (as ministers, governors, and high military ranks) are occupied
mainly by members of the Royal Family and to lesser extent by loyal ‗vassals‘.362 The king and
senior princes used to pay attention to matters of foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and
sensitive religious affairs, relegating other issues as economic development and education to
―American-educated princes of the third generation‖ or to loyal technocrats.363
iv. The fourth manifestation of the Saudi state‘s exceptions is its pre-modern pattern of
citizenship. The idea of citizenship is another key element in the modern state. In its
contemporary notion, citizenship means more than a membership in a political community; it is a
positive legal status with a set of rights and duties. It is ―an amalgam of ruling and being ruled in
turn‖.364 David Held states that ―citizenship is a status which, in principle, bestows upon
individuals equal rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities within
the political community‖365 On the other hand, for Max Weber, members of the traditional
societies are not considered truly citizens; rather, they are subjects to a patriarchal master. They
owe him personal obedience, based on traditional bases not a legal justification,366 and the
dominated culture within these societies is submission to the religion or mysticism. 367
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In the modern Saudi state, the pattern of Ruler-Citizens relationship is obviously
patriarchal, for three reasons:
First; citizens, according to the Basic Law, owe the king a personal loyalty and obedience. In
Article 6: ―In support of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger (PBUH), citizens
shall give the pledge of allegiance (bay„a) to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship
and ease.‖368
Second; as a rentier state, the relationship between the king and the people in Saudi Arabia is
based on an unwritten pact. According to this pact, the king guarantees for the people cradle-tograve socio-economic welfare services, in return, the people give up their political rights and
offer their political loyalty.369
Third; the nationality in Saudi Arabia is not a universal right, guaranteed to the whole
population. There is a special group termed bidoon or stateless citizens, who have not formal IDs
or recognized as Saudi citizens.370 Also, the King has the prerogative to give naturalized Saudi
citizenship to the foreigners (on extremely hard conditions)371 and to withdraw the nationality of
any Saudi citizen according to the law.372
To sum, the socio-political nature and the historical context associated with the
foundation of the Saudi state (i.e., unification of the state through tribal conquests and the central
role of the conservative Wahhabi call in legitimation of the state and in national identity making)
are responsible for traditional/modern hybridity of the Saudi state. The Saudi political system
attempts to maintain the traditional Islamic constitutional order within the modern state format;
368
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therefore, according to Noah Feldman, it appears as ―an image in a distorting looking glass. All
the familiar elements are there, but their size, their placement, and their interrelations are
altered.‖373
III. Competing models of the modern Islamic state:
The authoritarian Islamic state model of the Saudi state is religiously justified by the
Wahhabi political ideology. As mentioned, Wahhabism, as a conservative religious revivalist
movement, did not offer any political vision or theory different from those already existed in the
Sunni tradition, especially of the Hanbali scholar ibn Taymiyya.374
As regard the constitutional order, it adopts a traditional view, in which the power is
vested in the office of the imām, who is the main responsible of the implementation of Shari„ah.
The Wahhabi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Bāz states, in his interpretation of the verse
―O ye who believe, obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority
among you‖ that ―obeying those in authority follows on from fulfilling the obligation to obey
God and the messenger‖.375 In this constitutional order, the ruler practices unlimited powers in
politics, while the ummah has no right for political participation376 and only the „ulamā‟ who are
allowed to play a political role through offering advice to the ruler, but privately (not in
public).377 Therefore, Andrew Hammond argues that the Basic Law and the Shura council were
actually an attempt to codify the relationship between the king and the clerics and not the
people.378
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Also, Wahhabism accepts the two controversial mechanisms for gaining the political
power: istila‘ (seizing power by force), and ta‗iyyin (the appointment of a successor by the
current ruler, i.e., the hereditary rule).379 It justifies what J. G. Merquior termed the power
approach of legitimacy, which depends only on efficiency of the ruler in calling on resources and
power centers in the state.380 The Wahhabi scholars legitimize seizing power by force using the
same traditional logic of the classical Muslim scholars: ―a tyrannical sultan is better than
perpetual strife.‖381 According to Madawi al-Rasheed, ―ibn Abd al-Wahhāb‟s understanding of
the Islamic state was limited to applying shari„a and fighting religious innovation, without
paying attention to the most important pillar in state formation – the principle by which a ruler is
chosen, made accountable and changed if transgression from the true path is apparent.‖382
Concerning the ruler-citizens relationship, Wahhabism emphasizes the obligation of total
obedience even to the unjust ruler. Sheikh ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, following the tradition of ibn
Taymiyya, states that: the doctrine of ‟ahl al-sunnah is that the unjust rulers should be supported
and followed in what accords God‘s ordinances; praying behind them, sharing in jihad with
them, and utilizing their power in Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong … The rebellion
against the unjust rulers almost always results in greater evil and lesser goodness, so that, the
rebels do not succeed usually to reform neither religion nor worldly affairs. This proves that the
command of the Prophet (PBUH) to us to be patient with the unjust ruler is more correct … He
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ordered the rulers to be just and to do what in favors to their subjects, and ordered us to be
patient with their grievances and not to rebel against them.383
However, the act of rebellion in official Wahhabi discourse extends to include any form
of political activism, as: writing an article critical of the regime, advising the ruler in public, and
signing a petition calling for reform.384 ―It eventually deprives the Muslim community of its right
to have a say in political matters.‖ According to Wahhabism, the only legitimate criticism of
political authority is allowed in secrecy between scholars and rulers, and the latters are not under
any obligation to act according to the advice of the former.385 Therefore, al-Rhasheed concludes
that the official Wahhabi discourse produces consenting subjects rather than citizens.386
This authoritarian Saudi-Wahhabi model of Islamic state is fiercely challenged by the
Muslim Brotherhood political ideology in its two main traditions: the Bannaist and the Qutbist.
The Islamic state model in the former tradition is thought to be more democratic and in the latter
is more radical.
As for Ḥassan al-Bannā‟s political ideology, he admits that there is no blueprint for an
Islamic political system; however, he believes that the Islamic state is a central necessity in any
Islamic order, because in Islam there is no separation between din and dawlah. al-Bannā
specifies four rough criteria for the Islamic state:
First: Qur‟an has to be considered the fundamental constitution, from which all legislations
would flow. The other sources of legislation include the Prophet‘s sunnah and the practices of
the four Righteously Guided Caliphs.
383
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Second: the government should not be autocratic, as it should operate on the principle of shura
as mentioned in Qur‟an: ―And their affairs are a matter of consultation among them‖ (42:38)
Third: The rulers are not free; because their authorities are bound by both the Law of God and
the will of people articulated by their leaders and learned men (‟ahl al- ḥal wa al-„aqd)
Four: There is no rigid form for the Islamic state, as it could have different forms as long as the
essence is preserved.387
Ḥassan al-Bannā‟s model of Islamic state shows a democratic tendency. He mentions in
an epistle titled ―The System of Governance‖ that the responsibility of the ruler is one of the
pillars of the Islamic governance and the ummah has the right to monitor him meticulously. The
ruler has to consult the ummah and to respect its will. Moreover, he states that the parliamentary
system is a suitable tool to implement the Islamic principle of Shura.388 However, some authors
argue that al-Bannā was not truly pro-democracy. Despite his support for constitutionality and
parliamentary system, he has negative stance from the multiparty political system 389 and
considers it ―inimical to the spirit of unity dictated by the Qur‟an.‖390 Also, his notion of
representation is different from the Western democratic notion. He refers to the classical term of
‟ahl al-ḥall wa al-„aqd (the people who bind and loose), who, according to him, include three
categories: „ulamā‟, technocrats, and whoever has some kind of leadership role as heads of
families and tribal sheikhs.391
Nevertheless, this democratic tradition in Muslim Brotherhood has matured further in the
writings of other movement‘s intellectuals as Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi and Rashid al-Ghannoushi,
387
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who aggressively criticize the authoritarian theory of Islamic state. al-Ghannoushi, for instance,
comments on the religious doctrines that justify the hereditary rule and

make the Shura

(consultation) is not binding to the ruler: I am feeling disgusting from the presence of such rotten
ideas in our religious tradition and political thought, as it was the mines that undermined the
Islamic civilization and delivered us to the decadence.392
The main principles of the democratic theory of the Islamic state include:
i. The Islamic ummah is the true vicegerent of God, who has the supreme authority and who is
assigned the task of defining and implementing the Shari„ah,393 because the ijtihād (creative
religious reasoning) of the whole ummah (led by the guidance of Allah and enlightened by
His illumination) is the only protection from the collective perversity, 394 and the formula of
Islamic governance is ―Allah – The Ummah – The Ruler‖ and not ―Allah – The Ruler – The
Ummah‖.395
ii. The Shura in Islam is binding to the ruler, and it is not just an advice. As Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi
states: The principle of Shura will be meaningless and of no use if the ruler is allowed to
consult and then do whatever he wants and what is tempted by his entourage, regardless the
opinion of ‟ahl al-shura (the people of consultation). He wondered ironically ―how were
these people called the people of loosening and binding (‟ahl al- ḥal wa al-„aqd), if they
actually cannot loosen or bind?‖ He asserts that what happened –and are still happening – to
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the ummah because of authoritarianism strongly supports the view of obligation of shura,
although he admits it is a debatable issue.396
iii. In accordance with Ḥassan al-Bannā, Islamic democrats believe that democracy is a suitable
tool to apply the Islamic principles of governance. For instance, al-Ghannoushi believes in
the compatibility between democracy and Islam. He advocates ―an Islamic model of
democracy, which is a marriage between the Islamic value system and code of ethics on the
one hand and democratic procedures on the other.‖397 This model, from al-Ghannoushi‟s
point of view, does not solve the problem of authoritarianism in the Muslim World only, but
also solves the main problem in the liberal democracy; its materialistic philosophy. The
absence of transcendental values eventually transformed democracy into rule of the people
by the rich and powerful for the interest of the rich and the powerful.398
The democratic Islamists differentiate between democracy as philosophy and as a set of
tools (elections, general referenda, multiplicity of the political parties…etc.) that practically
enable the people to choose their rulers, to account them if they committed a mistake, and to
depose them and change them if they sidetracked.399 They strongly refuse the religious opinions
and fatwas that condemn democracy as bed„ah ―a religious innovation‖ and imitation of the
West. al-Ghannoush replies that the Prophet PBUH says ―the wisdom is the lost property of the
believer, so wherever he finds it then he has a right to it‖ and also the religious scholars say:
―wherever the just and the goodness, the God‘s shari„ah is found.”400He believes that as ―the
democratic system has worked within the framework of Christian values giving rise to Christian
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democracies and within the framework of socialist philosophy giving rise to socialist
democracies‖, it could work within the Islamic values framework giving Islamic democracies.401
Consequently, the democratic Islamic state theory represents an Islamic version of the
legal domination described by Max Weber. It accepts only the legal form of political legitimacy,
based on free choice or free bay„ah of the people, and refuses other two ‗deviant‘ forms: the
hereditary succession and seizing power by force. According to this theory, the relationship
between the ruler and the ummah is contractual. In this contract, ruler is a deputy in behalf of the
ummah, and he is committed to implement the shari„ah and to consult the ummah, and in return,
the ummah is committed to obey him.402 Furthermore, the ummah has the right to account the
ruler and dismiss him if he breached the terms of the contract.403 In other words, the obedience of
the people to the ruler is based on ―a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those
elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands‖, as Max Weber mentions in his
description of the legal domination.404
The Islamic democrats, consequently, adopt the modern concept of citizenship. They
believe that the ummah in the Islamic state are the source of authorities and the possessor of
supreme sovereignty in matters of governance. al-Ghannoush adds that there is a set of political
liberties that should be guaranteed by the state for its citizens, such as: the right to participate in
governance, the right to assembly, the right to information,…etc.405 Even for non-Muslims, alGhannoush refers to the Qur‟anic verse ―No compulsion in religion‖ (2:256) and to the
Prophet‘s saying ―Humans are equal as the teeth of the comb‖ as golden rules from which the
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rights of non-Muslims in Islamic state drive its legitimacy.406 However, he describes the
citizenship of non-Muslims in the Islamic state as ―a special citizenship‖, in which, non-Muslims
are not allowed to hold sensitive posts (as general leadership). But he argues that these
exceptions are very few and do not breach the general rule of equality in the Islamic state. 407
Regarding the power structure and distribution, the democratic theory of the Islamic state
adopts the principle of the division of power, as a consequence of the increased complexity in the
modern societies and as one of the basic remedies against authoritarianism.408 Although many
scholars as Mohammad Asad and Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri affirm the central nature of power
in the Islamic state as it was in the era of the Prophet PBUH and his Righteously Guided
Caliphs,409 and although many Prophetic sayings about the imāmah (the leadership of the
Muslim community) portray an image of a personal highly-centralized power,410 the supporters
of the separation of power in modern Islamic state argue that these historical precedents are not
binding, and the interest of ummah necessitates this separation to prevent centralization of power
that leads to despotism.411
Moreover, other scholars claim that the traditional Islamic state was the first state
applying the principle of separation of power by giving the religious scholars exclusively the
legislation authority without any intervention from the Imām.412 In Islam, there is an organic
separation, according to Tawfiq al-Shāwi, between the political representation of the ummah
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through the people of loosening and binding (‟ahl al- ḥal wa al-„aqd), who is entitled to choose
the rulers and to monitor them, and the religious representation of the ummah through the
scholars and jurists, who are responsible for legislation. This organic separation is the best fence
against the authoritarianism and abusing the legislative power by executives.413
On the other hand, the Qutbist version of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology has a
totally different perspective about the Islamic state. Abdelillah Belkeziz states that:
―With the Qutbian trend,...We will not read on the slate of this state any themes or
declarations of the sort such as: calls for the constitution; the ummah as being the source of
political power; or adapting the rulings of shari„ah according to the requirements of the age;
shari„ah and democracy; representation or elected parliaments and so on. Rather, what will
confront us are the terms al-Jāhiliyyah, unbelief – kufr, faith – imān, al-hākemiyyah,
revolution against society, and the immigration – hijrah out from the society of the
unbelievers or the hypocrites and so on.‖414
Actually, Sayyid Quṭb‟s view about the Islamic state is ambiguous and contradicting.
He admits that he is not preoccupied by the details of the Islamic system, because he argues
that the problem of Muslim ummah is to believe in the concept of al-hākemiyyah itself and to
submit their will to God‘s will. Moreover, he claims that asking about the details of the
Islamic system now is a trick played by al-Jāhiliyyah to embarrass the sincere preachers and
to push them hurrying up their steps; therefore, he calls them not to pay attention to these
tricks and to focus on preaching the principle itself.415
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In General, Sayyid Quṭb‟s concept of the Islamic state shows some contradictions. For
instance, he supports the contractual theory of governance, as he states that ―the Islamic
government is based on justice on the part of the ruler, obedience on the part of the ruled, and
consultation (shura) between the former and the latter‖. He also emphasizes that the ruler has
no privilege over other Muslims and that he should be elected by the umma and should be
obeyed only as long as he implements the shari‗ah.416 Nevertheless, he attacks aggressively
the democratic system and refuses the claim that shura is synonymous with parliamentary
government or any other forms of democracy; because, he argues, the system of shura in
Islam is divinely inspired and based on the principle of al-hākemiyyah, which means that the
absolute sovereignty belongs only to God. As for the secular democracy, it is based on the
principle that the absolute sovereignty is for the people. Therefore, it represents usurpation of
God‘s right of al-hākemiyyah.417
Sayyid Quṭb does not call for a purely religious state that derives its legitimacy from
God alone, as Abdelillah Belkeziz claims;418 as he states that the chief executive of the
Islamic state does not drive his legitimacy from a religious authority directly from heaven,
and he cannot assume his position except by the free choice of the Muslims.419 Rather, he
seems to adopt a mixed concept of sovereignty. He believes in the constitutional and
contractual bases of the government, but under the God‘s sovereignty, or what al-Mawdudi
has paradoxically called ―the theocratic democracy‖.420 According to Sayed Khatab, Quṭb
differentiates between two concepts: the source of authority and administration of authority.
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For him, the source of the governmental authority in the Islamic state is not the Muslim
community or the result of an election, but the enforcement of the shari‟ah, while the
administration of the authority should be based on shura.421 In short, the government in
Islam, according to Sayyid Quṭb, is neither theocratic nor autocratic; it lies midway between
theocracy and democracy.
The relationship between the divine and the human in the Islamic state is another
example of the contradiction in Sayyid Quṭb‟s theory. As a radical ideologue, Quṭb asserts
the uniqueness, the sacredness, and the unchangeable characteristics of the Islamic system.
He argues that ―the Islamic shari„ah did not come to exist through the evolution of Islamic
society; it has existed in its complete and constant form since it was divinely revealed.‖
Therefore, it is not founded by the Islamic society; rather, it is actually the founder of it, as
―in the shade of the shari„ah, Muslim community has developed in all spheres: political,
economic, social, moral, and in all other characteristics which signifies the shape and identity
of their society‖. And that is why the Islamic system of governance cannot coexist with any
other systems of human origin.422
Yet, in other site, Quṭb admits that Islamic shari„ah represents holistic principles and
general rules, and it is a wide frame that allows for coping with the continuous developments
in the humans‘ life. So that, it is the role of Muslims in each era to define, understand and
implement shari„ah according to their particular needs.423 Consequently, Islamic shari„ah is
not that constant, detailed, purely divine, and ready-to-use system, and the human role in the
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Islamic state is much greater than automatically applying the divine rulings, as mentioned in
his former radical view.
To conclude, there are many differences between the Wahhabi model and the Muslim
Brotherhood‘s doctrines of the Islamic state regarding the constitutional order, mode of
legitimacy, power structure and distribution, and pattern of citizenship. These differences are
summarized in table no. 4. The Islamic state doctrines adopted by Muslim Brotherhood seem
to fiercely challenge the religious base of the political legitimacy of the Saudi state, and this
could account for its negative stance from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, as it will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Wahhabi Model of
Islamic state

Categorization of the
Traditional,
model:
Authoritarian
Constitutional order:
- The ruler who is
entitled to implement
the Islamic shari„ah.
The
religious
scholars have the duty
to monitor him and
advise him.

Mode of legitimacy

- Pre-modern forms of
legitimacy
(traditional: dynastic
and religious - and
charismatic)

Muslim Brotherhood‘s doctrines of Islamic
state
The Democratic
The Radical Trend
Trend
Modern, Democratic
Theocratic
Democracy!
- The ummah is the God
is
the
true vicegerent of sovereign.
God, who has the - The source of
supreme authority and authority is derived
who is assigned the from implementation
task of defining and of the Shari„ah.
implementing
the - The administration
Shari„ah.
of
the
authority
- The relationship should be based on
between the ruler and shura
the
ummah
is
contractual.
Islamic version of Mixed:
Religious
Weberian pattern of (derived
from
legal domination
submission to God‘s
sovereignty) and legal
(derived from election
by the ummah)
115

Performance
legitimacy (patronage,
rentierism,
and
international alliances
support).
Power structure and Patriarchal,
highly Institutionalized,
N/A
distribution:
centralized, personal divided, law-bounded
vested power.
power.
Pattern of citizenship:

The ruled are subjects The ruled are citizens N/A
rather than citizens
with more or less
equal rights.

Table (4): The main differences between Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood‘s models of the
Islamic state.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ISLAMIST OPPOSITION IN AN ISLAMIC STATE
It is always stated that Islam in Saudi Arabia is ―a double-edged sword‖424, that is to say,
―if the state can use religion for legitimizing purposes, there is nothing stopping society from
using it to contest the ruler‘s legitimacy or at least attempt to de-legitimize their policy
orientation and preferences.‖425 In such state, where religion plays a key role in the political
legitimacy, what the regime fears most is that kind of opposition that can justify its political
claims in religious terms.426 According to Stephane Lacroix, Islam is ―the primary language in
which social rivalries are expressed.‖427 The contest within the modern Saudi state is not about
either there is a role of Islam in politics or not, but actually it is about what that role is and how it
should be.428
The emergence of Islamist opposition in the Saudi state was catalyzed by two main
factors: weakened influence of the official Wahhabi establishment and the spread of the Muslim
Brotherhood‘s ideology in the Kingdom. The dependence of the Wahhabi clerics on the state and
the utilization of them by Al Sa„ud to support their policies negatively affect their popular
credibility, and as the political discontent against Al Sa„ud intensified from 1990s, the official
Wahhabi institution ―found itself in the awkward position of defending an unpopular dynasty.‖429
In late 1990s and early millennium, the Wahhabi establishment was further weakened by death
of its two leading figures: Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Bāz, the grand mufti, and Mohammad al-
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„Uthaymin, in 1999 and 2001 respectively. The newly appointed mufti and the other members of
the Council of Senior Religious Scholars were obviously lacking the prestige enjoyed by the
deceased scholars.430
As regard the spread of Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology in Suadi state, it was mentioned
that the King Abdul-Aziz Al Sa„ud refused a request from Ḥassan al-Bannā in 1946 to establish a
legal branch for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Saudi Arabia Kingdom.431 He replied: ―what
good would that do? Here, we are all brothers and we are all Muslims.‖432 It seems that the King
suspected the Muslim Brotherhood‘s variant of Islamism.433 However, al-Bannā was keen to
maintain a good relationship with the Kingdom, and he used to go there for pilgrimage almost
every year.434
Yet, after the rise of the nationalist military regimes in the Middle East in 1950s, which
threatened the stability of the Arab monarchies, and brutally crashed the Islamist movements in
their countries, ―a symbiotic relationship‖ was formed between the Saudi regime and the Muslim
Brotherhood against their common enemy.435 The Kingdom gave refugee to the Egyptian,
Syrian, and Iraqi members of the Muslim Brotherhood; in return, the latter played a key role in
the propaganda against Nasserism and Baathism.436 Accordingly, Muslim Brotherhood‘s
members occupied influential positions in the media and the educational institutions that enable
them to circulate their literatures and spread their ideas.437 They were employed as imams in
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mosques, instructors and professors in schools and universities, and senior officials in the
ministry of education, who were entitled to design school textbooks and syllabuses. 438
The arrival of Muslim Brotherhood was associated with politicization of the Wahhabi
Islam, which was, till then, confining itself to correct the religious practices only. 439 A new form
of Wahhabism was made blending the puritanism of the Wahhabi call with the political ideas of
the Muslim Brotherhood in its two versions: the Bannaist and the Qutbist. This new Saudi
Islamist movement that emerged in 1960s became known as al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah ―the Islamic
Awakening‖. During 1970s, al-ṣaḥwa expands its influence to acquire ―a quasi-monopoly on
Islamic activism in the Kingdom‖, thanks to the influential position its initiators occupied in the
Saudi media and educational systems.440 The diagram in Fig.3 summarizes the Islamist traditions
shaping al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah‟s ideology as described by Stephane Lacroix.441
Structurally, al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah did not form a single well-defined organization;
instead, they constitute various Islamist movements.442 Among them, two main groups
“jama„at” are the most prominent: The first group claimed affiliation with the organization of
Muslim Brotherhood, and is formed of four loosely connected subgroups. The second group is
known as Sururi, derived from the name of Syrian sheikh Mohammad Surur Zayn al-„Abdin,
who was a scholar, separated from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and set up his own SalafiIkhwani tradition. It is usually claimed that the latter was the largest Sahawi group in the Saudi
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Kingdom. All the five organizations are formed of hierarchical structures, headed by an advisory
council.443

The Wahhabi tradition:
primarily religious - aiming
to purify the Islam from
wrong
practices
and
doctrines - directed toward
"deviant" religious groups as
Sufis and Shiites.

The Bannaist tradition:
primarily political aiming to establish the
Islamic State - directed
toward the imperialist
West

The Qutbist tradition:
primarily political aiming to establish the
Islamic State - directed
toward the godless
regimes in the Middle
East

al-ṣaḥwa
alislāmiyyah

Fig.3: Islamist traditions shaping al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah‟s ideology
The serious consequences of the emergence of this new Islamist ideology in the Saudi
state were not foreseen, according to David Commins:
―No one could have foreseen that the Muslim Brothers would successfully spread their ideas in
the kingdom and erode Wahhabism‘s hegemony. As long as Muslim revivalists supported Al
Sa„ud, their doctrinal differences with Wahhabism could be muted and the extent of revivalist
inroads into Saudi religious culture undetected. Wahhabism‘s soft spot was its political doctrine,
which dictates obedience to a ruler unless he commands a believer to violate Islamic law. This
puts Wahhabi religious scholars in the position of either defending rulers or offering quiet,
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behind the scenes criticism. Muslim revivalists have no compunction about openly denouncing
rulers or even striving to depose them … Revivalist thought offered a platform for political
dissent missing in Wahhabism.‖444
The rise of the Islamist opposition in the Saudi Arabia is back to late 1970s. In addition to
the Shiites revolts in the Eastern Province in 1979, in the wake of Iranian revolution, a Sunni
rebel was conducted in the same year by Juhaimān al-„Utaibi, who forcibly occupied the Great
Mosque in Mecca.445 al-„Utaibi‟s criticism of the Saudi government as corrupt and illegitimate
borrowed many ideas from the Qutbist version of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology. This
could be explained by the fact that Juhaimān and some of his group had studied in the University
of Madinah, where many members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were teaching. 446
Among these members was Mohammad Quṭb, the bother of Sayyid Quṭb and who played a key
role in construction of al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah ideology, so that he was called by many sheikh alṣaḥwa.447
However, the point of break between the Saudi regime and the al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah
was in early 1990s. In this period, two factors challenged the ―performance legitimacy‖ of the
Saudi state; First: weakened economy under the rule of King Fahd, as a result of the fall of the
oil prices in 1980s and a high growth rate of the Saudi population that doubles every twenty
years. Therefore, the government capacity to sustain the welfare programmes was cramped. The
popular frustration and discontent were further intensified because of the sharp contrast between
the economic hardship and the luxury life led the Royal family.448
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The second factor, which represented the most serious challenge to the Saudi regime
legitimacy, is the Gulf War crisis. A week after Saddam Hussein‟s invasion of Kuwait, King
Fahd decided to invite the American troops to protect the kingdom from a possible Iraqi threat.
This rapid decision, despite the billions of dollars spent by the state on military hardware in
1980s, exposed the regime to charges of incompetency.449 Actually, it was not the performance
legitimacy that was harmed by this decision only; it was also the religious legitimacy. Although,
the official Wahhabi establishment issued a fatwa to support this decision, it was hard to justify
in Shari„ah terms the invitation of infidels to defend the Islamic Holy Lands and the alliance
with them against a Muslim power.450
The crisis set off an unprecedented intense public debate inside the Saudi state.451
Moreover, when it unfolded, al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah was at height of its influence.452 They
suddenly transformed to be aggressive critics to the Saudi regime and the official Wahhabi
religious establishment.453 After the war in 1991, the demands of al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah
broadened out into a general call for political reform and not only the withdrawal of the
American troops.454 It utilized various tools to make pressure on the regime, for example, many
petitions signed by hundreds of religious scholars, university professors, and judges were
presented to the King Fahd during 1990s demanding structural changes in the Saudi state. The

Selvik and Stenslie, Stability and change in the modern Middle East, 254-255.
Hammond, The Islamic utopia, 76.
450
Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, 176.
451
Ibid.,177.
452
Lacroix, Awakening Islam, 158.
453
Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia,5.
454
Niblock, Saudi Arabia, 95.
449

122

most important of these petitions were Letter of Demands in spring 1991 and Memorandum of
Advice in September 1992.455
Both documents did not stop at questioning particular state policies, but they questioned
the Saudi state legitimacy in its entirety. And although the opponents did not use the term
democracy and use the term iṣlāh ―reform‖ instead, they were obviously influenced by the
political doctrines of the Islamic democrats.456 They ―bore the stamp not of Wahhabism but of
Muslim Brother-style revivalism.‖ 457
The Letter of Demands, for instance, included the call for creation of an advisory council
completely independent of the regime, establishment of justice and equality between all
members of the society by setting clearly defined rights and duties, acceptance of the principle of
accountability for all state officials ‗without exception‘, protection the rights of the individual
and of the society, removal all restrictions against the will and the rights of the people, and
guarantee the human dignity in accord with the norms of shari„ah.458 The Memorandum of
Advice almost repeated the same points included in the Letter of Demands but in details with
harsher criticism and more political language.459
On its side, the Saudi regime had to counterattack the criticism of the opponents. The
council of the Senior Religious Scholars condemned these petitions that ―sows the seeds of
dissension and hatred‖ and ―denigrates the state by completely ignoring its qualities, which
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indicates the bad intentions of its authors or their ignorance of reality‖ 460 and finally it states that
―The Board confirms that such acts violate the Islamic Shari„ah.‖461 In the same time, the regime
offered some concessions in 1992 by issuing the Basic Law of Governance, setting up the
Consultative Assembly, and codifying the power structure of the local government,462
nevertheless, these amendments actually were ostensible and only justified the status quo
political situations. In 1994, the Saudi regime found it is mandatory to use the repression. The
leaders of the Islamist groupings and hundreds of its members were arrested and imprisoned for
several years.463
The 1994 repression prompted ideological and strategic division between the reformist
and radical traditions in al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah trend.464 The reformists are who accept the
legitimacy of the Saudi government, and therefore, they strive to influence it peacefully and to
make it correspond more to their vision of the rightful Islamic state. While the radicals are those
who believe that the Saudi regime is illegitimate and strive to overthrow it by either peaceful or
violent means.465
The radical faction of al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah from mid-1990s became affiliated to alQā„dah in the Arabian Peninsula organization, which, according to Mohammed Ayoob, was a
―product of this marriage between Qutbist political ideas and innate puritanism and conservatism
of the Wahhabi doctrine.‖466 Sheikh Osama bin Laden himself was one of the Sahawis, who
became familiar with Qutbist ideas while attending King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, in the
460

Lacroix, Awakening Islam, 187.
Niblock, Saudi Arabia, 96.
462
Hammond, The Islamic utopia, 78.
463
Niblock, Saudi Arabia, 97.
464
Lacroix, ―Saudi Arabia and the limits of post-Islamism‖ in Post-Islamism: the changing faces
of political Islam, 278.
465
al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, 71.
466
Ayoob, The many faces of political Islam, 58.
461

124

late 1970s. In this university, he got in contact with Mohammad Quṭb and most importantly with
Abd Allah Azzam, the member of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and one of the leaders of
Afghani Jihad in 1980s.467
On the other hand, after their release from jails in early 2000s, the reformist faction of alṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah was transformed into a loyal opposition.468 They followed a strategy of coexistence with the regime and worked with it in certain issues as denouncing the terrorism and
violence within the Kingdom. Yet, they are still working on spreading their reformist religious
and political ideas.469
Since Gulf War crisis, the official political and religious Saudi discourse became openly
and aggressively criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology. For instance, the minister of
interior, Prince Nayif ibn Abd al-Aziz accused the Muslim Brotherhood of standing behind the
violence in Saudi Arabia.470 He stated that: ―When the situation became difficult for the Muslim
Brotherhood . . . they found refuge in the kingdom, which welcomed and protected them, and,
after God, guarded their lives . . . We found ways for them to support themselves: some of them
became teachers, others university professors—we opened the doors of schools and universities
to them. But unfortunately, they had not forgotten their earlier affiliations, and they began to
recruit people, to create movements, and they rose up against the kingdom‖471
Also, Sheik Mohammad ibn Abd al-Latif Al Sheikh, one of the official Wahhabi clerics
argues that ―The official Wahhabiyya is a call that resulted in the birth of the Islamic state.
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Traditional Wahhabis protect the state whereas Sahwis destroy it. The first manipulates religious
texts to support the state while the latter manipulates religious texts to destroy it.‖472
Conclusion:
In this thesis, the problematic of competing models of the modern Islamic state is
addressed in the case of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood. Based on the Weberian theory of
domination and his characterization of the modern state, the differences between the Islamic state
models in both Islamist ideologies are contrasted. The aim of the study is to find out what are the
differences between both models of the Islamic state and why the Saudi state takes a negative
stance from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.
In the beginning, the concept of the Islamic state was discussed. I suggest three main
pillars for the definition of the Islamic state: al-ummah, which is a compound religious, political,
cultural, and sociological term representing the ‗Muslim People‘, al-shari„ah, which represents
the Divine Islamic law, whose implementation is the raison d'etre of the Islamic state, and the alkhilāfah or the traditional Islamic political system, in which the Caliph represents the highest
political and religious authority.
However, the definition of the Islamic state raises many problematics; for instance: to
what extent the Islamic state represents a unique polity that could not be described or discussed
using foreign concepts or terms and whether the historical Islamic state was truly Islamic, given
that the traditional political Islamic thought was adapted to the de facto political deviations. Also,
how could the sacred unchangeable part of the Islamic shari„ah be differentiated from the human
context-related part included in the jurisprudence "fiqh" and manifested in the Islamic historical
experience?
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The problematic of the Islamic state is further complicated by the emergence of the
modern state, as the latter is characterized by specific patterns of legitimacy, constitutionality,
citizenship, and sovereignty, which are totally different from those of the traditional Islamic
state. The incompatibility between both state models, according to many authors, is responsible
for diversity and distortion of the modern models of the Islamic states.
Then, the study discussed the emergence of Islamism or the phenomenon of political
Islamic ideology as a necessary introduction to examine the variable models of the modern
Islamic state. It was argued that three main determinants are responsible for ideologization of
Islam: First: the political nature of Islam; as Islam is usually described as a political religion,
because the Prophet Muhammad PBUH built religious-cum-political community, in which, he
was the highest authority in both religious and political arenas. Second: the reaction to
colonialism; as for many authors, the social, political, and cultural transformations associated
with colonialism catalyzed the emergence of the modern political ideologies (secular and
Islamist) in the Muslim World. Third: a response to the challenge of modernity; as Islamism was
argued to be not only a conservative reaction to modernity, but also, a product of modernity as
well as a modernizing agent.
This thesis refutes the myth of monolithic Islamism that is composed of purely divine and
context-free doctrines. It was argued that there are different Islamist ideologies, each of them is a
net result of a reaction between three different elements: the sacred religious texts, the historical
and societal contexts, and the ideological inclination and the personal experiences of the
founding ideologues. Among the Islamism, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood are considered
the two major Sunni ideologies.
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Accordingly, many factors resulted in the differences between the Wahhabi and the
Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology. As regard the historical and societal contexts, the Wahhabi
ideology was shaped by the pre-modern tribal milieu of 18th-century Najd and was greatly
influenced by the predominating classical Hanbali tradition. In addition, the perverted Islamic
creeds and religious innovations represented the main challenges to which Wahhabism
responded. On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood ideology, in its Bannaist and Qutbist
versions, was shaped by a completely different context. It was the newly-established modern
state in Egypt in 1920s and 1930s the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, in case of
Ḥassan al-Bannā, while the Qutbist version of the Brotherhood‘s ideology was affected by the
1950s and 1960s post-independence Egypt. Obviously, Muslim Brotherhood was faced primarily
by modern and political threats (i.e., Westernization, colonialism, secular ideologies and
authoritarian military regimes); therefore, it formulated a more politicized and a more mature
form of Islamist ideology.
As for the founding ideologue, Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb, Ḥassan al-Bannā, and
Sayyid Quṭb represent different generations of the Islamic revivalists. ibn Abd al-Wahhāb was a
classical religious scholar with traditional intellectual resources, while the latters were
‗intellectuals‘, who blended classical Islamic traditions with Western ideologies and doctrines.
As an expected consequence, differences in the historical and societal contexts and in the
academic background and ideological inclinations of the founding ideologue resulted in doctrinal
variations between Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology. Wahhabism had a purely
religious reform agenda, concentrating on purification of the religious creeds and rituals from
polytheism and innovations. On the other hand, Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb adopted the
classical Hanbali political thoughts without any new ijtihad. He repeated the same arguments of
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ibn Taymiyya that ascribed an authoritarian nature to the Islamic state and justified religiously
the dynastic rule.
On contrast, Muslim Brotherhood‘s ideology was basically political. The main
contribution of Ḥassan al-Bannā in the political Islamic thought is his characteristic definition of
Islam comprehensiveness and his affirmation that Islam is din and dawlah. Furthermore, to
propagate his ideology, al-Bannā established a modern organization and applied different
socialization techniques to align its members with the organizations‘ values and goals. Later on,
during the second foundation of Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Quṭb further politicized and
radicalized its ideology. al-Bannā‘s concept of comprehensive Islam was transformed into a
totalitarian idealistic ideology in the Quṭb‘s concept of al-hākemiyyah, and in contrast to alBannā‘s moderate attitude, Quṭb adopted a more radical strategy of change.
On applying the Weberian theory of political domination and his characterization of the
modern state on the Islamic state models of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood, many
essential differences were discovered. The Saudi-Wahhabi model of the modern Islamic state
represents an example of traditional domination, with traditional (dynastic and religious)
legitimacy, highly centralized and personally vested political power, and patriarchal rulercitizens relationship.
On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood‘s doctrines of the modern Islamic state represent
an Islamic version of the Weberian legal domination. In its democratic tradition, it adopts the
legal form of legitimacy, divided, institutionalized, and law-bounded power, and a modern
concept of citizenship. The radical Qutbist theory of the Islamic state, embodied in his concept of
al-hākemiyyah, represents an ambiguous contradicting form of domination, blending religious
and legal patterns of legitimacy.
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In conclusion, the political doctrines of Muslim Brotherhood seem to fiercely challenge
the religious base of the Saudi political legitimacy. The Brotherhood‘s ideology in its both
versions (the Bannaist and the Qutbist) fuels both factions of the Saudi Islamist opposition: the
reformists and the radicals; therefore, the spread of the Brotherhood-like form of Islamism, alṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah, was associated with severe political unrest and legitimacy crises in the
Saudi state. To defend its legitimacy, the Saudi state decided to counterattack the Muslim
Brotherhood‘s ideology since mid-1990s, accusing it of being a deviant and seditious religiopolitical ideology.
Finally, there are two other topics the thesis suggests for further research and study:
First; it is of prime importance to examine Muslim Brotherhood‘s doctrines about the Islamic
state not as theoretical models in the writings of its ideologues and intellectuals, but in reality, in
their ruling experiences in different contexts, to verify the genuineness of their political claims
and sincerity of their proclaimed ideology.
Second; what are the consequences of the Saudi strategy to confront the Muslim Brotherhood‘s
‗threat‘ and to protect its political legitimacy?. Till now, the confrontational strategy has enabled
the Saudi regime to overcome many serious crises, especially during Gulf War and in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring. On the other hand, to confront the largest modern Islamic
movement and to be involved, directly and indirectly, in its repression will inevitably harm the
religious base of the legitimacy of the Saudi state; the state that always claims to be the main
defender of Islam and the sincere supporter of its cause.
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